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: Case No. 950242-CA 
Defendant -Appel lee. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICT ION 
This is an appeal from the f inal order of an annexat ion case heard 
in the Second Distr ict Court of Davis County, Utah. Jur isd ic t ion is based 
upon §78-2-2-(3)( j ) of the Utah Code. There have been no prior appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
A sta tement of the issues presented has been made in the brief of 
the Pla int i f fs , which the Defendant City f inds adequate , but Plaint i f fs to 
not state the proper standard of review for most of the issues ra ised. 
Compliance with annexat ion statutes is determined upon the basis 
of substant ia l compl iance. Sandv City v. Citv of South Jordan. 652 P.2d 
1316 (Utah 1982). This legal standard is a conc lus ion of law which, like 
all other conclusions of law, is given no deference by the appel la te court 
and reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
Factual f ind ings of the tr ia l court are given de ference by the appel late 
court, and are reviewed under a clearly er roneous s tandard . Findings of 
fact are clearly erroneous if they are so lacking in support as to be against 
the clear weight of the evidence. Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 
1989). However, the tr ial court 's determinat ion that the factual evidence 
before it substant ia l ly complies with a part icular s tatute is a discret ionary 
rul ing involv ing the appl icat ion of facts to law. Tr ia l cour ts are granted 
d iscret ion in making such a determinat ion , which is accorded "some 
degree of de ference" by the appel late court and rev iewed "with far less 
r igor" than conc lus ions of law. State v Pena. 
Accord ing ly , using the same numbering of issues as given by the 
Pla int i f fs , the fo l lowing standards for appel la te review are submi t ted : 
1. The f inding of the tr ial court that the assessment roll does in fact 
contain names of owners of real property is a factual f ind ing reviewed on 
a c lear ly er roneous s tandard. The tr ial court 's de te rmina t ion that the 
ev idence before it substant ia l ly compl ies wi th the assessment roll 
requirement is a d iscret ionary rul ing involv ing the app l ica t ion of facts to 
law, which is accorded "some degree of de fe rence" and reviewed 
"with far less r igor" than conclusions of law. State v Pena. 
2 & 3. The f inding of the tr ia l court that there was "no factual 
evidence" that the Defendant City abused its d isc re t ion in determin ing 
that the map requi rement of §10-2-416 was met is a fac tua l f inding 
reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard. The tr ia l court 's determinat ion 
that the ev idence before it substant ia l ly compl ied wi th the map 
requirement is a d iscret ionary rul ing involv ing the app l ica t ion of facts to 
law, which is accorded "some degree of deference" by the appel late court 
and reviewed "with far less rigor" than conc lus ions of law. State v Pena. 
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4. The t r ia l court 's rul ing that the ev idence before it concerning 
the pet i t ion and s ignature of Michael Gonce substant ia l l y compl ies with 
the peti t ion s ignature requirement is a d iscre t ionary rul ing involv ing the 
appl icat ion of facts to law, which is accorded "some degree of deference" 
and reviewed "with far less r igor" than conc lus ions of law. State v Pena. 
5. The t r ia l court 's rul ing that the ev idence before it concerning 
t rus tee s ignatures substant ia l ly compl ies wi th the s tatutory pet i t ion 
signing requirement is a d iscret ionary rul ing involv ing the appl icat ion of 
facts to law, which is accorded "some degree of deference" and reviewed 
"with far less r igor" than conclusions of law. State v Pena. 
6. The court 's decis ion to permit the w i thd rawa l , re instatement 
and adding of s ignatures to annexat ion pet i t ions is a conclus ion of 
law which is given no deference by the appe l la te court and reviewed 
for correctness. However, the tr ial court 's rul ing that the Defendant 
Ci ty 's act ions concerning the w i thdrawal , re ins ta tement and adding of 
s ignatures substant ia l ly compl ies with the s ta tu tory pet i t ion signing 
requirement is a discret ionary rul ing involv ing the app l ica t ion of facts to 
law, which is accorded "some degree of deference" by the appel late court 
and reviewed "with far less rigor" than conc lus ions of law. State v Pena. 
7. Tr ia l courts are granted a broad d iscre t ion in admit t ing or 
exc lud ing ev idence. State v. Pena. The review of the t r ia l court 's 
rul ings admit t ing evidence is on the basis of dec id ing whether the 
decis ions were an abuse of d iscret ion and beyond the bounds of 
reasonableness. State v. Teuscher. 883 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1994). 
8. The t r ia l court 's f inding that the Colon ia l View Condominium 
Associat ion is not an owner of real property separate from the individual 
unit owners is a f inding of fact reviewed under a c lear ly erroneous 
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standard. State v. Pena. Findings of fact are c lear ly erroneous if they are 
so lacking in support as to be against the c lear weight of the ev idence. 
Doel le v. Bradley, supra. 
9. The court 's rul ing that remaindermen after l i fe estates are not 
be counted as owners of real property under §10-2-416 is a conclusion of 
law which is given no deference by the appel la te court and reviewed for 
cor rec tness. State v. Pena. 
10. The cour t 's rul ing that a dead man is not an owner of real 
proper ty under §10-2-416 is a conclusion of law which is given no 
deference and reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
On Cross-Appeal the Defendant City raises the fo l lowing issues, all 
of which were preserved for appeal by the Defendant Ci ty 's Motion for 
Rulings of Law (R. 30-48) and the Defendant's Object ion to Rulings of Law 
(R. 263-264, 388): 
1. Did the t r ia l court err in in terpret ing §10-2-414 to require a 
count of owners and pet i t ion signers (for the purpose of determin ing 
a major i ty) at the mid-point of the annexat ion process when the pol icy 
dec lara t ion was adopted? 
2. Did the t r ia l court err in in terpret ing the term "owners of real 
p roper ty" in §10-2-416 to be modif ied by the phrase "as shown by the 
last assessment ro l ls"? 
3. Did the t r ia l court err in in terpret ing the term "owners of real 
proper ty" in §10-2-416 to include governmenta l ent i t ies? 
Al l of these issues involve conclus ions of law by the tr ia l court 
which are given no deference by the appel la te court and reviewed for 
cor rec tness . State v. Pena, supra. 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The fol lowing provis ions are determinat ive or of central importance 
to this appeal : 
Const i tu t iona l Prov is ions: The First Amendment to the U.S. 
Const i tu t ion re lat ive to the r ight of pet i t ion is inc luded, along with the 
Fourteenth Amendment , in Appendix A of the Defendant City's Addendum. 
Art ic le I, Sect ion 1 of the Utah Const i tu t ion is also inc luded. 
Statutory Prov is ions: Sect ions 10-2-414, 10-2-415 and 10-2-416, 
Utah Code Annota ted, are in Appendix A of the addendum of the Plaint i f fs. 
Sections 10-1-103, 10-8-8, 20A-4-105, 57-8-27, 59-2-303, 75-7-406, 
and 78-2-2(3) ( j ) , Utah Code Annota ted , are in Appendix A of the 
addendum of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) The Nature of the Case . 
This is an appeal of a f inal order by the Second Distr ic t Court of 
Davis County, Utah, which upheld an annexat ion of incorporated land by 
the Defendant Bount i fu l City. The Plainti f fs are residents of the annexed 
area. 
(b) The C ii ui ai» of Proceedings. 
In response to an annexat ion dr ive, the Defendant City formal ly 
accepted the pet i t ions on October 7, 1992, (R. 347), adopted a pol icy 
dec larat ion on December 2nd, (Ex. P-56. R. 342), and passed an 
annexat ion resolut ion on December 9th (Ex. P-54, R. 330). Plaint i f fs f i led 
an act ion to chal lenge the annexat ion in the Second Distr ict Court in 
Davis County on November 29, 1993 (R. 1-12). A bench t r ia l before the 
Honorable Judge Jon M. Memmott was held November 7 and 9, 1994. 
(c) D i s p o s i t i o n in the Court Below. 
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It was s t ipu la ted by the part ies that a major i ty of owners signed 
as of October 7, 1992, when the annexat ion pet i t ions were formal ly 
accepted by the Defendant City (R. 124, 347). Af ter making a number 
of decis ions in the course of the tr ia l concern ing the manner in which 
to determine owners , and what s ignatures ought to be counted , the 
t r ia l court found that 132 out of 263 owners of real proper ty val id ly 
s igned the annexat ion pet i t ions as of December 2, 1992, (Ex. D-3, R. 
329, 341-356) and 145 out of 263 on December 9, 1992 (Ex. D-3, R. 
330, 341-356) . Substant ia l compl iance with all annexat ion statutes 
was found and the annexat ion was upheld (R. 341-356, 357-358) . 
(d) Statement of the Facts. 
Certa in res idents of an unincorporated area of Davis County 
organized a pet i t ion to become annexed to the City of Bount i fu l (R. 468). 
The annexat ion pet i t ions (Ex. D-3) and a map of the proposed area of 
annexat ion (Ex. D-37) were f i led in the off ice of the City Recorder in 
ear ly October 1992 (R. 614). After receipt of these i tems, the Bount i fu l 
City Counci l on October 7, 1992, pursuant to §10-2-416, voted to accept 
the annexat ion pet i t ion for the purpose of adopt ing a pol icy dec larat ion 
(Ex. P-58, P-62, R. 347). On December 2, 1992, pursuant to §10-2-414, 
the Defendant City adopted a policy declarat ion (Ex. P-56, R. 342). Then 
on December 9, 1992, pursuant to §10-2-415, the Bount i fu l City Counci l 
adopted the annexat ion resolut ion (Ex. P-54, P-63, R. 330) . 
Prior to its vot ing on October 7th (Ex. P-58), December 2nd (Ex. 
P-62) and December 9th (Ex. P-63), the Defendant City made a count 
of s ignatures to determine whether a major i ty of the owners of real 
property wi th in the annexat ion area had signed the pet i t ion . Not knowing 
what rulings the District Court would later make concerning ownership and 
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signature val id i ty, neither the Defendant City at the t imes of those counts, 
nor the Plaint i f fs in their Complaint (R. 3-5), counted the same way that 
Judge Memmott did at tr ial (R. 341-356). But the Defendant City did 
determine on each of the three occasions that a major i ty of owners signed 
the pet i t ion (R. 341-356) . 
It was s t ipu lated by the part ies and incorporated by order of the 
Court (R. 124, 318, 347) that there were suf f ic ient pet i t ion s ignatures 
on October 7th. Prior to the policy dec lara t ion vote on December 
2nd, f i f teen pet i t ioners gave writ ten notice (Ex. D-4) to the Defendant City 
that they wished to wi thdraw their s ignatures from the pet i t ions , f ive of 
whom also gave wr i t ten notice to the Defendant City that they wished to 
reinstate their wi thdrawn signatures (Ex. D-5). Al l of these requests were 
honored (Ex. P-62). 
Af ter the pol icy declarat ion vote, and before the annexat ion 
reso lu t ion vote on December 9th, th i r teen more pet i t ion s ignatures 
were turned in (Ex. D-3, R. 341-356, 669-670) . These were added 
to the annexat ion pet i t ion totals (Ex. P-63). On December 9, 1992, 
the Defendant City adopted an Annexat ion Resolu t ion (Ex. P-54), a 
copy o f w h i c h is in Appendix B o f t he Addendum. 
Nearly a year later, Plaint i f fs f i led suit to cha l lenge the val id i ty 
of the annexat ion (R. 1-12). A bench tr ia l was held November 7 and 9, 
1994. Fol lowing presentat ion of the ev idence and the arguments of 
counsel , the tr ial court made its decis ion, which is ref lected in part in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 341-356, Append ix C of the 
Addendum), and a Judgment aff irming the annexat ion (R. 357-358) . The 
Defendant City agrees with the Findings of Fact by the t r ia l court , and 
incorporates them herein by this reference. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
1. THE PLAINTIFFS CHALLENGE AND MARSHAL EVIDENCE ON 
ONLY ONE OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT. ALL 
OTHER FINDINGS OF FACT ARE THEREFORE ACCEPTED AS VALID. 
Fol lowing the tr ia l of this case, the t r ia l court issued Findings 
of Fact (Appendix B of Addendum). In their appea l , P la in t i f fs attack only 
one of those f ind ings, which is found in their Point VIM. Al l unchal lenged 
Findings of Facts stand undisturbed and are accepted as va l id . 
In the event this Court f inds that the Pla int i f fs have in some 
manner ind i rect ly chal lenged any other F indings of Fact, then the 
Pla int i f fs have utter ly fa i led to carry their burden of marshal ing the 
ev idence. The consequence of an appel lant 's fa i lure to marshal evidence 
is that the Findings of Fact are accepted as va l id . 
2. THIS CASE IS FUNDAMENTALLY ONE CONCERNING THE 
HISTORICAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO PETIT ION GOVERNMENT. 
The r ight of the Amer ican people to pet i t ion thei r government 
is protected by the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment of the Const i tut ion 
of the United States provides: "Congress shal l make no 
law. . .abr idg ing . . . the right of the people. . . to pet i t ion the Government 
for a redress of gr ievances. " In addi t ion, Ar t ic le I, Sect ion 1 of the 
Utah Const i tu t ion s ta tes: "All men have the inherent and inal ienable 
r ight to . . .pe t i t ion for redress of gr ievances." 
3. STATE LAW HAS DELEGATED TO THE CITIES THE 
RESPONSIBIL ITY OF DETERMINING SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE 
WITH ANNEXATION LAWS, AND THE CITY DID FIND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE. 
The Utah Legis la ture has given ci t ies the author i ty and power 
to review annexat ion procedures for substant ia l comp l iance : 
10-2-415. (1) The members of the govern ing body of 
the munic ipa l i ty may adopt a resolut ion or ord inance of 
annexat ion by two- th i rds vote if: 
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(a) the annexat ion proposed in the policy dec larat ion, in 
the judgment of the municipality, meets the standards set forth 
in this chapter [Emphasis added.] 
This leg is la t ive grant of author i ty to the ci t ies was recognized 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Sweetwater Propert ies v. Town of A l ta . 
622 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1981). The Defendant City did in fact f ind 
substant ia l compl iance with annexat ion statutes and so stated in its 
annexat ion resolut ion (Appendix C of Addendum). The tr ia l court 
found no abuse of d iscret ion in the City's f ind ing . 
4. THE ROLE OF THE COURT IS TO REVIEW WHETHER THE CITY 
HAD STATUTORY ANNEXATION AUTHORITY, AND WHETHER THERE 
WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THAT AUTHORITY. 
LIBERALITY SHOULD BE EXTENDED IN MAKING THIS REVIEW. 
The role of the courts in annexat ion cases was cons idered by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Sandy City v. City of South Jordan, supra: 
The basic funct ion and duty of the courts is to determine 
whether a city has statutory author i ty . . . . Once we determine 
that a city has been in substant ia l compl iance with these 
requi rements , we wil l not alter the operat ion of the statute 
under which the annexat ion occurred. 
The Utah Supreme Court has establ ished that courts should be 
very caut ious in revers ing annexat ion decis ions by c i t ies : 
The courts are and should be reluctant to intrude into 
the prerogat ive of the legis lat ive branch of government , 
and will interfere with such action only if it...is in excess 
of the authority of the legislature. Bradshawv. Beaver CityT 27 
Utah 2d 135 (1972). [Emphasis added.] 
L iberal i ty should be extended in consider ing both the act ions of 
c i t ies in annexat ion matters, and in giving ful l cons iderat ion to the 
intent of the pet i t ion signers under the fo l lowing s ta tu tes : 
10-1-103 of the Utah Municipal Code. The powers 
herein delegated to any munic ipal i ty shal l be liberally 
construed to permit the municipality to exercise the powers 
granted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to the law. 
[Emphasis added. ] 
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20A-4-105. (6)(a) In count ing the bal lo ts , the counters 
shall give full consideration to the intent of the voter, (b) The 
counters may not inval idate a bal lot because of mechanica l 
and technical defects or fa i lure. . . . to fol low str ict ly the rules for 
ba l lo t ing. . . . [Emphasis added. ] 
This same pr inc ip le of vot ing l ibera l i ty should also be extended to 
the count ing of annexat ion pet i t ion s ignatures . 
5. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ASSESSMENT ROLL REQUIREMENT OF §10-
2-416. 
The assessment ro l l / jur isdict ion argument in Point I of the Plaint i f fs ' 
brief is an issue not preserved for appea l , const i tu tes a repudiat ion of a 
binding st ipu lat ion of the par t ies, and is a chal lenge to f ind ings of fact 
that fai ls the marshal ing ev idence requi rement . 
Two fundamenta l premises under l ie the claim of the Plaint i f fs that 
the assessment roll has no names of owners on it. One is that owners 
should be determined by the assessment ro l l . The second is that the 
County Assessor 's off ice must i tsel f enter the owners names onto the 
assessment ro l l . Both of these premises are faul ty . 
First, it is mistaken because the phrase "as shown by the last 
assessment ro l l " in §10-2-416 does not modify the requirement of "a 
majority of the owners of real proper ty . " Second, if the County Assessor 
ascer ta ins the names of the owners by having the County Recorder tel l 
him, that act ion is in fu l f i l lment of the law and not contrary to it. 
6. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MAP REQUIREMENT OF §10-2-416. 
Points II and III of the Pla int i f fs const i tu te a chal lenge to a f inding 
of fact . The tr ia l court entered a f inding that there was "no factual 
evidence" of abuse of discret ion in the Defendant City's determinat ion of 
compl iance with the map requi rement , and Plaint i f fs d i rect ly chal lenge 
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this wi thout meet ing the requi rement of marshal ing ev idence. 
The evidence before the t r ia l court showed that the requirement 
of an off ic ial map turned into the City Recorder was fu l f i l l ed , and that 
the requirement that peti t ion s ignatures be turned into the City Recorder 
was fu l f i l led . The wording of the s tatute i tsel f in no way supports the 
Plaint i f fs ' content ions. 
7. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PETITION SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT OF 
§10-2-416 IN COUNTING THE SIGNATURE OF MICHAEL GONCE. 
It is ind isputable that Michael Gonce favored annexat ion and 
that he signed a pet i t ion to that ef fect , though it was d i f ferent in form 
from other pet i t ions. The issue, then, is whether his known preference 
ought to be d isregarded (and in fact counted as an ant i -annexat ion 
s ignature) because of technica l i ty as to fo rm. State law requires no 
specif ic peti t ion form. Had the Legislature wanted a def in i te form it could 
have required one. The l iberal i ty in giving "ful l considerat ion to the intent 
of the voter" under §20A-4-1 05 ought to be appl ied here. 
8. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PETITION SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT OF 
§10-2-416 IN COUNTING TRUSTEE SIGNATURES ON TRUST 
PROPERTIES. 
The tr ial court found that some proper t ies were owned by trusts 
and that the t rustees signed the annexat ion pet i t ions. §75-7-406 of 
the Utah Code upholds the rel iance of the Defendant City on these 
t rustee s ignatures: 
75-7-406. With respect to a th i rd person deal ing with 
a t rus tee. . . [ t ]he third person is not bound to inquire whether 
the t rustee has power to act or is proper ly exerc is ing the 
power.. . . 
Even if it is considered that t rustee recit ing of their t rustee capacity 
is a "rule for ba l lo t ing" ( i .e . , pet i t ion ing) , at most the omission is only a 
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"mechanica l and techn ica l defect or fa i lu re . " The l ibera l i ty of publ ic 
policy expressed in §20A-4-1 05(6) should "give fu l l cons idera t ion to the 
intent of the voter . " 
9. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PETITION SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT OF 
§10-2-416 IN ALLOWING SIGNATURES TO BE WITHDRAWN, 
REINSTATED AND ADDED TO THE ANNEXATION PETIT IONS. 
The Defendant City and the tr ial court permit ted people to wi thdraw 
their s ignatures from the annexat ion pet i t ions, to re ins ta te them if 
w i thdrawn, and to add them, if done prior to the f ina l annexat ion 
resolut ion vote. This is supported by Utah case law: 
Why should these pet i t ioners not be granted their 
request if it is presented to those in author i ty before the 
latter make annexat ion a fait accompli by ignoring the request 
of those, who, apparent ly with studied conv ic t ion , honest ly 
seek to erase their par t ic ipat ion before act ion is taken? 
* * * 
There should be some way in this case, under the 
statute, reasonably and fair ly and quickly to appr ise almost all 
of the people as to the issue and consequences invo lved, with 
reasonable opportuni ty for all or some of the people to express 
their approval or disapproval within a reasonable t ime, in 
accordance with statutory formulae. That would seem to 
comport with the t radi t ional Amer ican idea as re f lec ted in the 
histor ical town meeting concept. Jensen v. Bount i fu l , 20 Utah 
2d 159, 435 P.2d 284 (1967). [Emphasis added. ] 
The earl ier l i t igat ion concerned. . .whether or not persons 
could add or subtract their names from the pet i t ions . 
[Footnote c i ta t ion to Jensen: emphasis added. ] 
10. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE. 
The State v. Pena cr i ter ia in favor of grant ing greater d iscret ion 
to the tr ia l court apply to the evident iary dec is ions cha l lenged by the 
Pla in t i f fs . The t r ia l court was faced with a host of issues, most of 
which have never been addressed either by the leg is la t ive statutes or 
by the cour ts . No statutory or case law rules adequately address ing 
the re levance of all these annexat ion facts has ever been spel led out, 
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and the s i tuat ion presented by these facts is suf f ic ient ly new that 
appel late courts have so far not ant ic ipated and ar t icu la ted what factors 
should be outcome determinat ive . 
Faced with this s i tua t ion , Judge Memmott estab l ished a workable 
legal f ramework for deal ing with annexat ions. Fol lowing Jensen, 
requir ing that the names of owners be "as shown on the last assessment 
ro l ls , " he estab l ished a prima facie l ist, and, as stated in his pre- t r ia l 
Rulings of Law and in the Conclus ions of Law, es tab l ished certa in 
necessary legal mod i f i ca t ions . 
Throughout the tr ial Judge Memmott consistent ly stayed wi th in this 
f ramework. Evidence concern ing legal modi f icat ions such as the f ive 
deceased owners of record, the condominium associat ion, and life estates 
was admi t ted. On the other hand, evidence unrelated to the ident i f ied 
legal issues and expanding beyond the statutory "as shown" requirement 
was not admi t ted . 
1 1 . THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE COLONIAL 
VIEW HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION AS AN "OWNER OF REAL 
PROPERTY" UNDER §10-2 -416 . 
The o r i g ina l condom in i um dec la ra t i on and its amended 
d e c l a r a t i o n , which are recorded in the off ice of the Davis County 
Recorder, were admit ted as Exhibi ts D-27 and D-28. They each s ta ted: 
Neither the percentage of undivided interest in the 
Common Areas and Faci l i t ies nor the right of exclusive use of 
a Limited Common area and Faci l i ty shall be separated from 
the Unit to which it attains] and even though not spec i f ica l ly 
ment ioned in the instrument of t ransfer , such parcel of 
undiv ided interest and such right of exclus ive use shal l 
automatical ly accompany the transfer of the Unit to which they 
re late. 
In addit ion, Exhibit A to these declarat ions proved that the individual 
unit owners account for 100% of the ownership of the common areas. 
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Since the individual unit owners own their own unit and their percentage 
of the common areas together , nothing is owned by the Homeowners 
Associat ion. The tr ial court 's dec is ion that the homeowners associat ion 
is not a separate owner f lowed direct ly from the sound evidence before it. 
The tr ial court 's decis ion based on the evidence is wel l founded, 
and not clear ly er roneous. No wi tness or ev idence contrad ic ted the 
tr ial court 's dec is ion. The clear weight of the ev idence was in support of 
the tr ial court 's dec is ion . 
12. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED REMAINDERMEN 
ON LIFE ESTATES AS "OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY" UNDER§10-2 -
416. 
Remaindermen after l i fe estates may not possess the property 
invo lved, and may not exerc ise any right of present ownership over 
it. They are not taxed as property owners, and under the tr ia l court 's 
rul ing ownership is determined from the tax assessment ro l l . Their 
interests lie st r ic t ly in the fu ture . They should not be counted now as 
owners when they in fact have no present r ights of ownersh ip . 
13. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED A DEAD MAN AS 
AN "OWNER OF REAL PROPERTY" UNDER §10-2 -416 . 
It goes wi thout saying that dead men do not sign pet i t ions, so 
counting them as owners guarantees they wil l always be non-pet i t ioners . 
Good public policy requires that such matters as these be determined by 
the l iv ing. In the case of Kenneth Murray, it was proven that he died, that 
he had held ownership of the property jo in t ly with his wi fe , and the she 
surv ived him. Therefore , Judge Memmott appropr ia te ly counted her as 
the owner contemplated under §10-2-416. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING §10-2-414 TO 
REQUIRE A COUNT OF OWNERS AND PETITIONERS (FOR THE 
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PURPOSE OF DETERMINING A MAJORITY) AT THE MID-POINT OF THE 
ANNEXATION PROCESS WHEN THE POLICY DECLARATION WAS 
ADOPTED. 
Sta tu to r y and case law have comb ined to e s t a b l i s h two po in t s , 
and no others, at wh ich c i t i es must asce r ta in that a ma jo r i t y of the 
owners of real p rope r t y w i th in the p roposed area of a n n e x a t i o n have 
s igned , and st i l l s i gn , the annexa t ion pe t i t i ons . These two po in ts are 
at the beg inn ing of the p rocess , when the City Counc i l vo tes on 
whe the r to accep t the a n n e x a t i o n pe t i t i on , and at the e n d , when the 
City Counc i l vo tes on the annexa t ion reso lu t i on . The f i r s t po in t , at the 
beg inn ing of the p rocess , is es tab l i shed by §10 -2 -416 of the Utah 
Code. The second po in t , at the end of the p rocess , is e s t a b l i s h e d by 
the Utah Supreme Cour t in Jensen v. Boun t i f u l C i ty . 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE TERM 
"OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY" IN SECTION 10-2-416 TO BE 
MODIFIED BY THE PHRASE "AS SHOWN IN THE LAST ASSESSMENT 
ROLLS." 
A cr i t ical ly impo r tan t te rm is "owners of real p r o p e r t y " in § 1 0 - 2 -
416 . Based upon Jensen v. Boun t i f u l C i ty , the t r ia l cour t ru led tha t 
owners are de te rm ined by the last assessment ro l l . Th is ho ld ing ought 
to be over ru led because it was never in tended by the Utah Leg is la tu re 
that the phrase "as shown by the last assessment ro l l s " shou ld modi fy 
"a major i ty of the owners of rea l p rope r t y . " 
Beg inn ing w i th the Utah Code of 1898, the law requ i red that a 
major i ty of real p roper ty owners pet i t ion for annexa t i on . There was no 
ment ion of "as shown on the last assessmen t ro l l s . " In 1957 the Utah 
Leg is la tu re amended the sec t ion to inser t the phrase : "and the owners 
of not less than one - th i r d in va lue of the real p rope r t y , as shown by 
the last assessmen t ro l l s . " There was never an in ten t in the 
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1957 legis lat ion to impose the assessment rol l requi rement onto the 
major i ty of real property owners . It was intended to apply only to the 
valuat ion requi rement . 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE TERM 
"OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY" IN §10-2-416 TO INCLUDE 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTIT IES. 
Governments should not be counted as "owners of real property" 
under §10-2-416 because their part ic ipat ion in the annexat ion process is 
set forth under §10-2-402. That s tatute sets up a boundary commission 
to consider annexat ion protests by affected ent i t ies. An "affected ent i ty" 
is defined at Sect ion 1 0-1-1 04(8) to mean "a county, municipal i ty or other 
enti ty possessing taxat ion powers . . . . " 
The s ta tu to r y means by wh ich g o v e r n m e n t a l en t i t i es may 
par t i c ipa te in the annexat ion process is not as "owners of real property" 
involved in pet i t ion ing, but rather as "affected ent i t ies" which may appeal 
to the Boundary Commiss ion. 
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
1. THE PLAINTIFFS CHALLENGE AND MARSHALL EVIDENCE 
ON ONLY ONE OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT. ALL 
OTHER FINDINGS OF FACT ARE THEREFORE ACCEPTED AS VALID. 
At the conclusion of the case the tr ial court entered Findings of Fact 
(R. 310-330, 341-356) , which are set for th in fu l l , together with the 
Conclusions of Law, in Appendix B of the Addendum. In their appeal brief 
the Plaint i f fs fai l to ment ion, re ference or d iscuss any of these Findings 
of Fact except in Point V I I I . At no other point do they expl ic i t ly chal lenge 
any of them. Accord ing ly , these unchal lenged facts stand undisturbed 
and are accepted as va l id . This court has prev iously held: 
These factual f ind ings have not been chal lenged and 
therefore remain und is tu rbed. Judge Bench's dissent in 
Luckau v. Board of Review of the Industr ia l Commiss ion. 
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840 P.2d 8 1 1 , (Ct. App. 1992). 
In the event this Court f inds that the Plaint i f fs have in some 
manner chal lenged the Findings of Fact, then the Plaint i f fs have utterly 
fa i led to carry their burden of marshal ing the ev idence. The general 
importance of marshal ing ev idence was stated in Robb v. Ander ton , 863 
P.2d 1322 (Utah App. 1993): 
The marshal ing requi rement provides the appel la te 
court the basis from which to conduct a meaningfu l and 
expedient review of facts chal lenged on appeal . 
The speci f ic requirements of marshal ing have been set out in 
numerous recent cases, including the fo l l ow ing : 
It [Pla int i f f ] fa i led , however, to expl ic i t ly chal lenge 
the dist r ic t court 's f indings of fact . Even if we could read 
the State's brief as chal lenging the t r ia l court 's f ind ings, 
the State has fai led to meet its burden on appeal to "marshal 
the evidence in support of the f ind ings and then demonst ra te 
that despi te this ev idence, the t r ia l court 's f ind ings are so 
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
ev idence, ' thus making them 'c lear ly er roneous. [Ci tat ions 
omit ted.] State v. 1.37 Acres of Real Property. 253 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30 (Utah 1994). 
The consequences of an appel lant 's fa i lure to marshal evidence 
has also been thoroughly establ ished in recent years : 
Clayton Plastic Surgery has fa i led to marshal the 
ev idence in support of the tr ia l cour t 's f ind ings. Instead, 
Clayton Plast ic Surgery has merely selected facts and 
excerpts of test imony from the tr ia l that support its posi t ion 
and then reargued those facts to this court . This tact ic ignores 
the burden that Clayton Plastic Surgery must carry to properly 
chal lenge the tr ial court 's f indings of fact . Because Clayton 
Plastic Surgery has fai led to marshal the evidence, we accept 
the trial court's findings of fact as accurate and review the trial 
court's conclusions based on those findings. Commercia l 
Union Assocs. v. C layton. 863 P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1993). 
[Emphasis added.] 
2. THIS CASE IS FUNDAMENTALLY ONE CONCERNING THE 
HISTORICAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO PETITION GOVERNMENT. 
The right of the Amer ican people to pet i t ion their government 
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is protected by the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment of the Const i tut ion 
of the United States provides: "Congress shal l make no 
law. . .abr idg ing . . . the right of the people. . . to pet i t ion the Government 
for a redress of g r ievances. " This provis ion is made app l i cab le to the 
States by the Four teenth Amendment . In add i t ion , Ar t i c le I, Sect ion 
1 of the Utah Const i tu t ion states: "All men have the inherent and 
inal ienable r ight to . . .pe t i t ion for redress of g r ievances . " 
The t r ia l court recognized that this case is wi th in the context of 
the Amer ican t rad i t ion of the c i t izen- in i t ia ted pe t i t i on . "The pet i t ion 
process , " he sa id , "is one of the most impor tant p rocesses that we 
have in which the average ci t izen can get involved to pet i t ion the 
government f rom outs ide and ask the government to act . " (R. 286, 
344-345) 
3. STATE LAW HAS DELEGATED TO THE CITIES THE 
RESPONSIBIL ITY OF DETERMINING SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE 
WITH ANNEXATION LAWS, AND THE DEFENDANT CITY DID FIND 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE. 
The Utah Legis la ture has given to c i t ies the author i ty and power 
to review annexat ion procedures for substant ia l comp l iance : 
10-2-415. (1) The members of the govern ing body of 
the munic ipa l i ty may adopt a resolut ion or o rd inance of 
annexat ion by two- th i rds vote if: 
(a) the annexat ion proposed in the pol icy dec la ra t ion , in 
the judgment of the municipality, meets the s tandards set forth 
in this chapter . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
This leg is la t ive grant of author i ty to c i t ies was recogn ized by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Sweetwater Propert ies v. Town of A l ta . supra, at 
page 1183: 
Sect ion 10-2-415 provides that if (1) the pol icy 
dec lara t ion meets the standards set for th in the annexat ion 
s ta tu te , in the judgment of the municipality, and (2) there 
is no protest f i led by an affected ent i ty , the ci ty may, by 
two- th i rds vote of the governing body, adopt an ord inance 
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of annexa t ion . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
This was the standard adopted by the t r ia l court (R. 290, 345): 
Conclusions of Law 
3. The determinat ion of whether the annexat ion pet i t ion 
has met all of the statutory standards is vested in the City, and 
the review by the Court is to determine whether the City has 
abused that d iscre t ion , (also page 6 of Rul ing) 
The Defendant City did in fact f ind subs tant ia l compl iance with 
the annexat ion laws. This was ref lected in its annexat ion resolut ion 
(Ex. P-54), which reci tes fu l f i l lment of the s ta tu tory requi rements. 
(See Appendix C of the Addendum). The t r ia l court found no abuse 
of d iscret ion in this determinat ion as the annexat ion was upheld (R. 
341-356, 357-358) . 
4. THE ROLE OF THE COURT IS TO REVIEW WHETHER THE CITY 
HAD STATUTORY ANNEXATION AUTHORITY, AND WHETHER THERE 
WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THAT AUTHORITY. 
LIBERALITY SHOULD BE EXTENDED IN MAKING THIS REVIEW. 
The role of the courts in annexat ion cases was cons idered by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Sandy City v. City of South Jo rdan , supra: 
The basic funct ion and duty of the courts is to determine 
whether a city has statutory author i ty . . . . Once we determine 
that a city has been in substant ia l compl iance wi th these 
requ i rements , we wil l not alter the operat ion of the statute 
under which the annexat ion occurred. 
This was also the holding of the tr ia l court (R. 2 8 8 - 2 9 1 , 345): 
Conclusions of Law 
2. The proper inquiry of the Court is to determine 
whether the Defendant Bount i fu l City had s ta tu tory author i ty 
to annex the area in quest ion, and whether there was 
substant ia l compl iance with statutory requ i rements . 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that if a city can 
demonst ra te "substant ia l compl iance" with annexat ion laws, its act ions 
wi l l be upheld : 
If the defendants [the Town of Cedar Hil ls and the 
Utah Boundary Commission] could show ei ther actual or 
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substant ia l compl iance with Utah's annexat ion s ta tu te , the 
annexat ion would have to be upheld. Doty v. Town of Cedar 
Hi l ls. 656 P.2d 993 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court has establ ished that courts should be 
very caut ious in revers ing annexat ion decis ions by c i t ies: 
The courts are and should be re luctant to int rude into 
the prerogat ive of the legis lat ive branch of government , 
and will interfere with such action only if it...is in excess 
of the authority of the leg is la ture. Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 
supra. [Emphasis added. ] 
L iberal i ty should be extended by the Courts in cons ider ing the 
act ions of c i t ies in annexat ion matters. This l iberal i ty is s ta tu tor i ly 
mandated: 
10-1-103 of the Utah Municipal Code. The powers 
herein de legated to any munic ipal i ty shal l be liberally 
construed to permit the municipality to exercise the powers 
granted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to the law. 
[Emphasis added. ] 
The l iberal i ty was ref lected by the tr ial court as fol lows (R. 290 -291 , 
345): 
Conclus ions of Law 
4. Annexa t ion laws are to be in terpreted l iberal ly to 
ef fectuate their purpose and further publ ic pol icy. 
5. The annexat ion resolut ion of the Bount i fu l City 
Counci l is ent i t led to a presumpt ion of va l id i ty , and the 
burden of proof is upon the Plaint i f fs in this case. 
A publ ic pol icy of l iberal i ty in recogniz ing and giv ing val id i ty 
to the intent ion of voters is also statutor i ly mandated: 
20A-4-105. (6)(a) In count ing the bal lo ts , the counters 
shall give full consideration to the intent of the voter, (b) The 
counters may not inva l idate a ballot because of mechanica l 
and technical defects or fa i lure. . . . to fol low str ict ly the rules for 
ba l lo t ing . . . . [Emphasis added. ] 
Pet i t ion ing and bal lo t ing are quite d i f ferent matters procedura l ly . 
Annexat ion pet i t ion ing is very informal and unregu la ted, whi le e lect ion 
voting is very highly formal ized and regulated. Yet even in the very formal 
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arena of the Elect ion Code, there is this l ibera l i ty . This same public 
policy of l iberal i ty should also be extended to the count ing of annexat ion 
pet i t ion s ignatures. 
Throughout this case Plaint i f fs have sought by c la imed technica l 
errors to frustrate the known intent ions of the annexat ion pet i t ion signers. 
As a matter of publ ic pol icy, courts ought to f ind ways to fu l f i l l known 
intent, not ways to f rustrate it. It was never intended that hyper- technical 
rules should apply to the c i t izen- in i t ia ted annexat ion pet i t ion process. No 
such rules are set out in the State Code, and ought not to be imposed now. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ASSESSMENT ROLL REQUIREMENT OF §1 0-
2-416. 
The argument in Point I of the Pla in t i f fs ' br ief is an issue not 
preserved for appeal , and ought to be re jected for that reason. The 
Plaint i f fs never advanced this argument at any t ime at t r ia l , whether 
in the form of a mot ion, an object ion or o therwise. A review of the 
record cited by the Plaint i f fs at R. 581-584 wil l show only that the 
assessment roll was d iscussed. The tr ia l court was never given the 
opportuni ty to consider the ju r isd ic t ion argument now being advanced. 
The fa i lure to preserve the matter is a waiver of it. State v. Brown. 856 
P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993). This issue is raised for the f i rst t ime on 
appeal and ought not to be considered fur ther . Ong. Int ' l (U.S.A.) , Inc.. 
v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). 
In their Point I, Plaint i f fs contend that "where no names appeared on 
the assessor's rolls and the City, accordingly, was wi thout ju r isd ic t ion to 
determine that it was in substant ia l compl iance with law." This posi t ion 
cannot be sustained for a number of reasons. 
First, the Plaint i f fs should not be permi t ted to make this argument 
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at al l . St ipulat ions are conclusive and binding on the part ies unless relief 
is granted theref rom. Maxwell v. Maxwel l . 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1990). 
It was s t ipu la ted by the part ies, and there fore ordered by the t r ia l court, 
that "a major i ty of the owners of real proper ty s igned the annexat ion 
pet i t ions at the t ime the Bount i fu l City Counci l voted to accept them on 
October 7, 1992." (R. 124, 347.) Af ter making such a s t ipu la t ion, 
Pla int i f fs should not now be permi t ted to repudia te it by arguing 
incons is tent ly that there is no ju r isd ic t ion because there are no names 
upon which to judge substant ia l compl iance. By s t ipu la t ion , there were 
names on the assessment roll on October 7th. How can there be no names 
on December 2nd or December 9th wi thout repudia t ing the st ipu lat ion? 
S e c o n d , the P la in t i f f s , a rgumen t c h a l l e n g e s F ind ings of Fact 
w i thou t marshal ing the ev idence. The s tar t ing point of the t r ia l court on 
the assessment roll quest ion is the fo l lowing (R. 2 9 1 , 345) : 
Conclusions of Law 
7. The term "owners of real proper ty" as used in Section 
10-2-416 means those owners of real property as shown on the 
last assessment roll prior to December 2, 1992, subject to the 
rul ing of law stated by this Court . 
The Plaint i f fs did not contest this legal conclus ion at t r ia l and do not 
do so in their appea l . The tr ial court went on to issue the fo l lowing (R. 
394, 341-356) : 
Findings of Fact 
1. Al l of the propert ies wi th in the annexat ion area 
involved in this case are l isted by tax ser ia l number on Exhibit 
A, which is at tached hereto and incorporated herein by this 
re ference. Some owners owned more than one parce l , and 
those dupl icates are l isted on the last page of Exhibi t A. 
Owners were counted once, regard less of how many parcels 
they owned. 
2. There were 263 owners of real property w i th in the 
annexat ion area, the names of whom are listed on Exhibi t A. 
[Emphasis added. ] 
In their br ief the Plaint i f fs do not exp l ic i t ly cha l lenge these two 
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Findings in any way. They neither quote nor re ference them. 
Accord ing ly , they must stand as va l id . And even if it is found that 
Plaint i f fs do impl ic i t ly chal lenge these F ind ings, they fai l to marshal the 
ev idence, and the Findings must st i l l stand as va l id . 
The content ion of the Plaint i f fs in their Point I is a d i rect chal lenge 
to these Findings of Fact. The tr ia l court held that "owners of real 
property" means those owners shown on the last assessment rol l , then 
f inds as a fact that there are "owners of real proper ty . . . the names of whom 
are l isted on Exhibit A." The Plaint i f fs, however, say on appeal that there 
are no names on the assessment rol l . This is a direct chal lenge to the trial 
court 's Findings of Fact. Point I ought to be summari ly rejected for fai lure 
to marshal the ev idence, as set for th in deta i l in Argument No. 2, above 
Consider ing Plaint i f f 's Point I fur ther , two fundamenta l premises 
under l ie the c la im. One is that owners should be determined by the 
assessment ro l l . The second is that the County Assessor 's off ice must 
i tself enter the owners names onto the assessment ro l l . 
It is the posi t ion of the Defendant City that the phrase "as shown 
by the last assessment rol l" in §10-2-416 does not modify the requirement 
of "a majority of the owners of real property." Rather, it only modifies the 
requirement of "at least one-third in value of the real property." This point 
is presented at length hereafter in Argument No. 2 in the Cross-Appeal 
sect ion of this brief, which is incorporated by this re ference. This Court 
need not decide this part icular claim of the Pla int i f fs if it sustains the 
argument of the Defendant City on this point . 
Even if the Court does not sustain that point , the second premise 
of the Pla in t i f fs ' posi t ion is faul ty on its face. The under ly ing factual 
source of compla int is that in the computer program of Davis County, 
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only the Recorder 's off ice enters land ownersh ip in fo rmat ion , only 
the Assessor 's of f ice enters valuat ion in fo rmat ion , and only the 
Treasurer 's of f ice enters tax in format ion. In other words , Plaint i f fs 
say that because the Assessor did not enter ownersh ip names in his 
por t ion of the computer program, the assessment roll bears no names. 
This is unnecessar i ly rest r ic t ive. 
The State s tatute in quest ion is as fo l lows: 
59 -2 -303 . [In effect in 1992.] (1) Prior to May 22 
each year, the county assessor shal l ascer ta in the names of 
the owners of all property which is subject to taxa t ion by 
the county , and shal l assess the proper ty to the owner, 
c la imant of record, or occupant in possess ion or cont ro l at 
12 o'clock m, on January 1 in the tax year, unless a 
subsequent conveyance of ownership of the real proper ty 
was recorded in the off ice of the county recorder more than 
14 calendar days before the date of mai l ing of the tax not ice. 
If the County Assessor ascerta ins the names of the owners of 
proper ty in the county by having the County Recorder te l l h im, that 
act ion is in fu l f i l lment of the law and not contrary to it. If only the 
County Recorder 's off ice enters the names on the computer program, 
that act ion v io la tes no law. After a l l , it is the County Recorder who 
has the legal duty to record conveyances of land. It wou ld be absurd 
for the County Assessor to independent ly examine the Recorder 's 
books to determine ownersh ip , and to then enter it into the computer 
h imsel f when the County Recorder just down the hal l has already 
done so. The facts are that there was an assessment rol l (Ex. P-107), 
and that owners were ident i f ied by name (R. 341-356) , and there 
accord ing ly was ju r isd ic t ion to proceed wi th de termin ing substant ia l 
compl iance with the annexat ion statutes. 
The cla ims of the Plaint i f fs on this issue are w i thout mer i t . 
6. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL 
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COMPLIANCE WITH THE MAP REQUIREMENT OF §10-2-416. 
The Plaint i f fs complain in their Points II and III about the annexat ion 
map. Their content ions are that there was no substant ia l compl iance 
because (1) the map made by the City Engineer's off ice was not prepared 
before the annexat ion drive began (requir ing all pet i t ions and s ignatures 
to be inval idated), and (2) because some individual pet i t ions did not have 
a map or legal descr ip t ion ( requi r ing 34 s ignatures to be inva l ida ted) . 
The tr ia l court entered the fo l lowing (R. 295-296, 3 2 0 - 3 2 1 , 342, 
613-617): 
Findings of Fact 
6. The City has determined that the requi rement of a 
map prepared by the City Engineer being submi t ted to the 
City Recorder together with the pet i t ion s ignatures , as set 
forth in 10-2-416, has been met. There is no factual evidence 
that this decision by the City constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. [Emphasis added. ] 
In their br ief the Plaint i f fs do not chal lenge this Finding in any 
way. They nei ther quote nor reference it. Accord ing ly , this Finding 
must stand as va l id . And even if it is found that Pla int i f fs do chal lenge 
this Finding, they do not in any way marshal the evidence, and the Finding 
must st i l l stand as va l id . 
Yet points II and III of the Plaint i f fs const i tute a d i rect chal lenge to 
the tr ial court 's Finding of Fact. When the tr ial court says that "there is no 
factual ev idence" of an abuse of d iscret ion in the City's determinat ion of 
compl iance with the map requi rement of §10-2-416, the Plaint i f fs must 
take this f inding head-on by marshal ing the evidence and then try ing to 
discredi t it. This they have fa i led to do. Accord ing ly , thei r Points II and 
III ought to be summar i ly re jec ted, as set forth in detai l in Argument No. 
2 ,above . 
The statute which sets for th the map requirement is as fo l lows: 
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10-2-416. Whenever a majori ty of the owners . . . sha l l 
desire to annex. . . they shal l cause an accurate plat or map 
of such ter r i tory to be made under the superv is ion of the 
munic ipa l engineer or a competent surveyor, and a copy of 
such map, cer t i f ied by the engineer or surveyor as they 
case may be, shal l be f i led in the off ice of the recorder of 
the munic ipa l i ty , together with a wr i t ten pet i t ion s igned 
by the pet i t ioners . 
No Utah case law has been found that gives any ass is tance in the 
in terpreta t ion upon the part icular map issue raised by the Pla int i f fs . 
The case offered by the Plaint i f fs, Johnson v. Sandy City Corporat ion. 28 
Utah 2d 22, 497 P.2d 644 (1972), is not appl icable to this quest ion at a l l . 
It deals with another statute (§10-2-415) and with a comple te ly separate 
requ i rement - i.e., that the map be recorded with the County Recorder 
after the annexat ion has been approved by the City Counc i l . 
In apply ing the facts before it to the law, the t r ia l court made 
this d iscret ionary rul ing (R. 295-296, 320 -321 , 347-348, 613-617) : 
Conclusions of Law 
23. The City has determined that the requ i rement 
that a map prepared by the City Engineer be submi t ted to 
the City Recorder together with the pet i t ion s igna tu res , as 
set forth in 10-2-214, has been met. There is no abuse of 
d iscret ion in this dec is ion. The Court does not f ind in the 
s ta tu te that there is a requirement that a map be at tached to 
each ind iv idual annexat ion pet i t ion page that is actual ly 
s igned. There fore , the Court rejects the cha l lenges to the 
val idi ty of all s ignatures without a map indiv idual ly at tached to 
the s ignature page, including chal lenges to the fo l lowing 
s ignatures . . . . 
The t r ia l court is granted discret ion in making this de te rmina t ion , 
which is accorded "some degree of deference" by the appel la te court and 
reviewed "with far less rigor" than conclusions of law. State v. Pena. 
There are three uncontrover ted facts in regard to this issue. One 
is that the pet i t ions were turned into the off ice of the City Recorder 
(Ex. D-3, R. 616) . A second is that an accurate map of the terr i tory 
to be annexed, made by a l icensed surveyor, was f i led wi th the off ice of 
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the City Recorder (Ex. D-37, R. 614, 616). And a third is that these were 
both done prior to the Bounti ful City Council vot ing to accept the pet i t ion 
on O c t o b e r 7 , 1992 (R. 614-616) . 
Pla int i f fs contend that the City Engineer 's map must be prepared 
before the pet i t ion ing begins. Nowhere in the Utah Code does it state 
such a requ i rement . Plaint i f fs also contend that any map at tached to 
the pet i t ions can only be the "o f f ic ia l " one, and that it would be v io lat ion 
of law if an "uno f f i c ia l " map depict ing the same area were used. Aga in , 
nowhere in the Utah Code does it state such a requ i rement . And the 
Plaint i f fs contend f u r t h e r t h a t if there is no map at tached the s ignatures 
on that par t icu lar pet i t ion are inval id . Nowhere in the Utah Code does it 
s tate such a th ing . Had the Utah Legis lature wished to make these 
requi rements , it could easi ly have wri t ten them express ly into the law. 
The Pla int i f fs are at tempt ing to raise hyper - techn ica l barr iers 
to f rust rate known intent. Those who s igned the pet i t ions and were 
owners wi th in the proposed annexat ion area were counted as having 
s igned, as they obviously wanted to be. They were s igning for 
themse lves , not o thers . There was no ev idence about any confusion 
by anyone over the map. Their intent should not be d iscarded . The 
Elect ion Code l ibera l i ty in bal lot ing of g iv ing "ful l cons idera t ion to 
the intent of the voter" should be appl ied to pet i t ion ing as we l l . 
Pet i t ioning is a very informal process. The "o f f i c ia l " map prepared 
by the City Engineer 's off ice and submit ted to the City Counci l for its 
acceptance on October 7th was unambiguous, and remained so 
thereaf te r . The s ignatures on the pet i t ions were l ikewise unambiguous 
and only those related to the map were cons idered. There is no evidence 
whatever that anyone signing the pet i t ions or the City Counci l was 
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confused about this matter. On this issue, there is w i thout a doubt 
substant ia l compl iance with the law. 
In this appl icat ion of facts to the law, the t r ia l court is granted 
"some degree of deference. " Its d iscret ion was proper ly exercised in 
this instance and should be af f i rmed. 
7. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PETITION SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT OF 
§10-2-416 IN COUNTING THE SIGNATURE OF MICHAEL GONCE. 
The t r ia l court counted property owner Michael Gonce as a valid 
annexat ion pet i t ion signer (Ex. D-3, R. 298-299, 343, 348-349) . The 
Plaint i f fs complain in their Point IV that s ignature should not be counted 
because it was not in the same pet i t ion form as the other people who 
s igned, and because it did not have a map at tached to it. The map issue 
has been prev iously addressed. 
The tr ia l court issued the fo l lowing (Ex. D-3, R. 298-299 , 343): 
Findings of Fact 
10. The signature of Michael Gonce (01-139-0014) 
as an annexat ion pet i t ioner is on a form d i f fe rent from the 
other pet i t ioners , but the format used does c lear ly state 
that he wishes that the annexat ion take p lace. 
In their br ief the Plaint i f fs do not cha l lenge th is Finding in any 
way. They nei ther quote nor reference it. Accord ing ly , this Finding 
must stand as va l id . And even if it is found that P la in t i f fs do chal lenge 
th is F ind ing, they do not in any way marshal the ev idence , and the 
Findings must st i l l stand as va l id . 
The statute which sets forth the pet i t ion s ignature requirement 
is as fo l lows: 
10-2-416. [A] major i ty of the owners of real 
p roper ty . . .sha l l . . . f i le . . .a wr i t ten pet i t ion s igned by the 
pet i t ioners . 
There is no case law interpret ing this s ta tu te as to the format of 
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the pet i t ion requ i red . 
In app ly ing the facts before it to the law, the t r ia l court made the 
fo l lowing d iscre t ionary rul ing (R. 298-299, 348-349) : 
Conclus ions of Law 
26. The s ignature of Michael Gonce (01-139-0014) 
as an annexat ion pet i t ioner is in substant ia l compl iance 
with the law, and is to be counted as a val id s igna tu re . 
The t r ia l court is granted discret ion in making this de te rmina t ion , 
which is accorded "some degree of deference" by the appel la te court and 
reviewed "with far less vigor" than conclusions of law. State v. Pena. 
As far as the form of his s ignature is concerned, one th ing can 
be ind isputably conc luded: Michael Gonce favored annexat ion (Ex. 
D-3, R. 298-299, 343). The issue, then, is whether his known preference 
ought to be d is regarded (and in fact counted as an ant i -annexat ion 
signature) because of technical i ty as to form. The l iberal i ty in giving "full 
considerat ion to the intent of the voter" should be extended here. There 
is no speci f ic pet i t ion form required by State law. There is no law that 
states that the form used by Mr. Gonce is i l legal . Had the Legis lature 
wished to require a def in i te pet i t ion format or word ing, it could have done 
so. 
In this app l ica t ion of facts to law, the tr ia l court is granted "some 
degree of de fe rence . " It's d iscret ion was proper ly exerc ised in this 
instance and should be a f f i rmed. 
8. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PETITION SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT OF 
§10-2-416 IN COUNTING TRUSTEE SIGNATURES ON TRUST 
PROPERTIES. 
A number of proper t ies wi th in the annexat ion area are owned by 
family t rusts (R. 341-356) . The trustees who s igned as owners of 
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these propert ies did so wi thout referencing their t rustee capaci ty (Ex. 
D-3, R. 343). Though the in tent ions of the t rustees are known, the 
Plaint i f fs compla in in their Point V that their s ignatures are inva l id . 
The tr ia l court issued the fo l lowing (Ex. D-3, R. 296-298 , 343): 
Findings of Fact 
8. The fo l lowing proper t ies were owned by t rus ts , 
and were signed by trustees wi thout referencing their t rus tee 
capaci ty : [Names omi t ted. ] 
Under this F ind ing, two important facts are es tab l i shed . First, 
some propert ies are owned by t rusts . Second, the t rus tees of those 
named trusts signed the annexat ion pet i t ions. In their brief the Plaint i f fs 
do not chal lenge this Finding in any way. They nei ther quote nor 
reference it. Accord ing ly , this Finding must stand as va l id . And even if 
it is found that Pla int i f fs do chal lenge this F inding, they do marshal the 
ev idence, and the Finding must st i l l stand as va l id . 
The statute which sets out the pet i t ion s ignature requi rement 
reads as fo l lows: 
10-2-416. [A] major i ty 
p roper ty . . .sha l l . . . f i l e . . .a wr i t ten 
pet i t ioners . 
There is no case law interpret ing 
the s ignatures requ i red . 
In apply ing the facts before it to the law, the t r ia l court made the 
fo l lowing d iscret ionary rul ing (Ex. D-3, R. 296-298, 341-356) : 
Conclus ions of Law 
24. Trustees of t rusts which own proper t ies wi th in 
the annexat ion area need not expressly sign the annexat ion 
pet i t ions in their t rustee capaci t ies . There has been 
substant ia l compl iance when the t rustees signed the pet i t ion 
in their own names. Therefore, the Court re jects the 
chal lenges to the val id i ty of s ignatures by t rus tees that 
do not state their t rustee capaci ty , including the fo l lowing 
s ignatures : [Names omit ted. ] 
of owners of real 
pet i t ion s igned by the 
this statute as to the form of 
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The t r ia l court is granted d iscret ion in making this de te rmina t ion , 
which is accorded "some degree of deference" by the appel late court and 
reviewed "with far less r igor" than conclus ions of law. State v. Pena. 
Sect ion 75-7-406 of the Utah Code upholds the re l iance of the 
Defendant City and the t r ia l court on these t rustee s ignatures in the 
fo l lowing language: 
75-7-406. With respect to a third person deal ing with a 
t rustee. . . [ the third person is not bound to inquire whether the 
t rustee has power to act . . .and a third person, wi thout actual 
knowledge that the t rustee is exceeding his powers or 
improper ly exerc is ing them, is ful ly protected in deal ing with 
the t rustee as if the t rustee possessed and properly exercised 
the powers he purports to exerc ise. 
The s igning of an annexat ion pet i t ion is not of the same class as 
a conveyance of real property by deed. No publ ic purpose is served 
by such a requi rement as is advocated by the Pla int i f fs . 
This is similar to the s i tuat ion of an undisc losed agent . In Garland 
v. F le ischmann. 831 P.2d 107 (Utah 1992), it was held: 
It is wel l es tab l ished in the law that a pr inc ipal is l iable 
for the acts of his agent within the scope of the agent 's 
authori ty, i r respect ive of whe ther the pr incipal is d isc losed or 
und isc losed. The fact that an agent acts in his own name 
wi thout d isc los ing his pr inc ipal does not preclude l iabi l i ty on 
the part of the pr incipal when he is d iscovered to be such by a 
third party who has dealt with the agent. 
Even if it is considered that trustee recit ing of their t rustee capacity 
is a "rule for ba l lo t ing" ( i .e . , pet i t ion ing) , at most the omiss ion is only a 
"mechanica l and technica l defect or fa i lu re . " The l ibera l i ty of publ ic 
pol icy expressed in §20A-4-1 05(6) requires that the counters "give ful l 
cons iderat ion to the intent of the voter." In annexat ions , the s ignature 
counters should give ful l cons iderat ion to the pet i t ioner 's known intent, 
and not throw it out. There is no less of a publ ic pol icy involved in 
pet i t ioning than in ba l lo t ing . 
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Plaint i f fs ' argument would require c i t izen pet i t ion organizers 
to inquire whether an owner is a t rus tee, and to see a copy of the trust 
agreement to determine whether the person has author i ty to s ign. 
Such formal ism would unduly compl icate what is des igned to be an 
informal process. It would super impose a requi rement of "absolute 
compl iance" where the law requires only "substant ia l compl iance. " 
In this appl icat ion of facts to law, the t r ia l court is granted "some 
degree of deference. " Its d iscret ion was proper ly exerc ised in this 
instance and should be a f f i rmed. 
9. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PETITION SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS OF 
§10-2-416 IN ALLOWING SIGNATURES TO BE WITHDRAWN, 
REINSTATED A N D A D D E D T O T H E ANNEXATION PETITIONS. 
After the acceptance of the annexat ion pet i t ion on October 7, 
1992, and before the policy dec lara t ion vote on December 2, 1992, 
f i f teen people wi thdrew their s ignatures f rom the annexat ion pet i t ions 
(Ex. D-4), and f ive of those same people s igned documents reinstat ing 
them (Ex. D-5). Between December 3rd and December 9th, when the 
annexat ion resolut ion was adopted, another th i r teen people added their 
names to the annexat ion pet i t ions (R. 341-356) . All of these wi thdrawals, 
reinstatements and pet i t ions were al lowed by the City. In their Point V I , 
Plaint i f fs complain that annexat ion pet i t ion s ignatures should only be 
permit ted to be wi thdrawn, never re instated or added. 
The tr ial court entered the fo l lowing (Ex D-3, R. 305, 341-356): 
Findings of Fact 
19. Thir teen s ignatures were added to the pet i t ions 
between D e c e m b e r 3 a n d 9 , a s ind icated on Exhibi t A. 
Conclus ions of Law 
17. As a matter of s t ipu la t ion of the part ies and as 
f inding of fact and conclusion of law, a major i ty of the owners 
of real property signed the annexat ion pet i t ions at the time the 
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Bount i fu l City Counci l voted to accept them on October 7, 
1992. 
In their br ief the Plaint i f fs do not cha l lenge these Findings in 
any way. They neither quote nor reference them. Accord ing ly , these 
Findings must stand as va l id . And even if it is found that Plaint i f fs 
do chal lenge these Findings, they do not in any way marshal the evidence, 
and the Findings must st i l l stand as va l id . 
The statute which sets forth the pet i t ion s ignature requirements 
is as fo l lows: 
10-2-416. [A] major i ty of the owners of real 
p roper ty . . .sha l l . . . f i le . . .a wr i t ten pet i t ion s igned by the 
pet i t ioners . 
There is Utah case law in terpret ing this s ta tu te as to the 
w i thd raw ing , re instat ing and adding of s ignatures to the annexat ion 
pet i t ions. Jensen v. Bount i fu l City, supra, held ( though its phrasing 
is now "pol i t ica l ly incorrect") as fo l lows: 
Like a woman's prerogat ive to change her mind, we 
think the pet i t ioners ' request for wi thdrawal of their s ignatures 
before the pet i t ion for annexat ion was acted upon is even 
someth ing more convincing than the accepted and revered 
feminine l icense. They say they were confused and under the 
inf luence of a pet i t ion-ci rculator 's zealous pot ion. Why should 
these petitioners not be granted their request if it is presented 
to those in authority before the latter make annexation a fait 
accompli by ignoring the request of those, who, apparently 
with studied conviction, honestly seek to erase their 
participation before action is taken? [Emphas is added. ] 
* * * 
There should be some way in this case, under the 
statute, reasonably and fair ly and quickly to appr ise almost all 
of the people as to the issue and consequences involved, with 
reasonable opportunity for all or some of the people to express 
their approval or disapproval wi th in a reasonable t ime, in 
accordance with statutory formulae. That would seem to 
comport with the t radi t ional Amer ican idea as re f lected in the 
h is tor ica l town meeting concept . [Emphas is added. ] 
In Doenaes v. Salt Lake Citv. 614 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court in terpreted the Jensen dec is ion to apply to both 
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addit ion and w i thdrawal of s ignatures : 
The ear l ier l i t igat ion concerned. . .whether or not persons 
could add or subtract their names from the pet i t ions . 
[Footnote c i ta t ion to Jensen: emphasis added. ] 
In cons ider ing the statute and the case law in this case, the t r ia l 
court made the fo l lowing (R. 293, 346): 
Conclus ions of Law 
14. S ignatures on the annexat ion pet i t ion may be 
both added and wi thdrawn prior to the annexat ion resolut ion 
vote of the City Counc i l . 
The tr ia l court 's decis ion to permit the w i thdrawa l , re insta tement 
and adding of s ignatures to annexat ion pet i t ions is a conc lus ion of law 
which is given no deference by the appel late court and reviewed for 
correctness. However, the tr ial court 's determinat ion that the Defendant 
City 's act ions concern ing the w i thdrawal , re insta tement and adding of 
s ignatures substant ia l ly compl ies with the statutory pet i t ion s igning 
requirement is a d iscret ionary rul ing involv ing the app l ica t ion of facts to 
law. The tr ia l court is granted d iscret ion in making this de te rmina t ion , 
which is accorded "some degree of deference" by the appel late court and 
reviewed "with far less r igor" than conclus ions of law. State v Pena. 
Plaint i f fs quote two sources in support of their con ten t ion , namely, 
the treat ise o fMcQu i l l i n on Munic ipal Corporat ions and the Utah case of 
Jensen v. Bount i fu l City. 20 Utah 2d 159, 435 P.2d 284 (1967) . For the 
proposi t ion quoted , McQui l l in ci tes but one case, a 1955 Ohio case. 
It does not quote the law in Utah as held in Jensen and in Doenges. As 
has been seen in the preceding cases, both of these cases state that 
s ignatures can be added as wel l as w i thdrawn. 
The annexat ion pet i t ion statutes of Utah are s i lent on the quest ion 
of adding and wi thdrawing s ignatures. How, then, can it be found that in 
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permi t t ing both addi t ions and wi thdrawals , that the Defendant City has 
exceeded any statutory author i ty? Fur thermore, case law is clearly 
indicat ive that both are not only permit ted but requ i red . 
The pos i t ion of the Plaint i f fs is counter to logic and publ ic pol icy. 
It is, of course, fundamenta l ly unfair for one side operate under one set 
of ru les, and for the other side to operate under d i f ferent ru les. Also, it 
would be contrary to public policy to hold that as the annexat ion process 
cont inues and property owners within the proposed annexat ion area 
become more in formed, their abi l i ty to act is increas ing ly restr icted 
by such an arb i t rary rule. 
In this appl icat ion of facts to law, the t r ia l cour t 's d iscret ion was 
properly exerc ised and should be af f i rmed. 
10. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE. 
In Point VII of their brief Plaint i f fs compla in of the t r ia l court 's 
admission of ev idence. The heading o f the i r point is couched in terms of 
substant ia l compl iance, but that legal s tandard does not apply here. In 
general a tr ial court is granted broad discret ion in its decis ion to admit or 
exclude ev idence. State v. Pena. The appel la te court wi l l presume that 
the discret ion of the tr ial court was properly exerc ised unless the record 
clearly shows to the contrary. State v. Morgan. 913 P.2d 1207 (Utah App. 
1991). Abuse of discret ion is acting beyond the bounds o f reasonab i l i t y . 
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 
In approaching the issue of the admiss ib i l i ty of ev idence, it is 
helpfu l to refer to the important opinion of State v. Pena. That case 
held that two of the cr i ter ia weighing in favor of greater t r ia l court 
d iscret ion were (1) "when the facts to which the legal rule is to be 
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appl ied are so complex and varying that no rule adequate ly addressing 
the re levance of all these facts can be spel led out , " and (2) "when the 
si tuat ion to which the legal pr inciple is to be appl ied is suf f ic ient ly new to 
the courts that appel la te judges are unable to ant ic ipate and ar t icu late 
what factors should be outcome determinat ive . " 
These cr i ter ia certainly apply to the evident iary quest ions raised by 
Pla int i f fs . The t r ia l court was faced with a host of unprecedented 
annexat ion issues, most of which have never been addressed ei ther by 
the legis lature or by the courts. No statutory or case law rules adequately 
address ing the re levance of all these annexat ion issues have ever 
been spel led out, and the si tuat ion presented by these facts is suff ic ient ly 
new that appel late courts have so far not ant ic ipated and ar t icu lated what 
factors should be outcome determinat ive. 
Faced with this s i tua t ion , Judge Memmott created a workable 
legal f ramework for deal ing with annexat ions (R. 294) by es tab l ish ing a 
list of owners' names against which a City could compare the annexat ion 
peti t ion s ignatures. Fol lowing the Jensen case requi r ing that the names 
of owners be "as shown on the last assessment ro l ls , " he estab l ished a 
prima fac ie l ist and, as stated in the pre-tr ia l Rul ings of Law and in the 
f inal Conc lus ions of Law, establ ished cer ta in necessary legal 
modi f icat ions to deal with ambigui t ies . Those inc luded the fo l lowing (R. 
294, 345-347) : 
Conclusions of Law 
7. The term "owners of real property" as used in Sect ion 
10-2-416 means those owners of real property as shown on 
the last tax assessment roll prior to December 2, 1992, subject 
to the rulings of law stated by this Court. [Emphasis added. ] 
9. The homeowners associat ion of a condomin ium 
deve lopment may or may not const i tu te an owner of real 
property under Sect ion 10-2-416 depending upon the 
par t icu lar facts of that condomin ium. 
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10. Governmenta l ent i t ies which own proper t ies wi th in 
the proposed annexat ion area are owners of real proper ty 
under Sect ion 10-2-416. They are ei ther owners as a legal 
enti ty or corporate enti ty or some other type of ent i ty , but they 
are st i l l owners of real property. 
1 1 . Future interest holders under a deed of t rust 
reserv ing a l i fe estate for the grantors are not owners of 
real property under Sect ion 10-2-416. 
12. An ind iv idual who is dead is not an owner of real 
property under Sect ion 10-2-416. In the case of real proper ty 
where the t i t le is held in jo int tenancy with the r ight of 
surv ivorsh ip , the surv iv ing jo int tenant is the sole owner. In 
the case of jo int tenancy, without this right of surv ivorsh ip , or 
other jo int ownership arrangement, the estate of the decedent 
would hold the ownership after the death of an owner. 
13. When a property is owned by a par tnersh ip , the 
val idi ty of the s ignature of a partner may or may not const i tu te 
a s ignature of an owner of real property under Sect ion 10-2-
416 depending upon the part icular facts of that par tnersh ip . 
16. When a home is owned by a t rust , the t rust is the 
owner of real property under the annexat ion laws, which 
const i tu tes one owner of real property under Sect ion 10-2-
416. 
Working wi th in this f ramework, Judge Memmott addressed 
evident iary issues involving the establ ishing of names on the assessment 
roll for annexat ion purposes. He admit ted ev idence that was re levant to 
the conc lus ions of law quoted above and did not admit ev idence that 
was unre la ted. Accordingly, ev idence concerning the f ive deceased 
owners of record , which related to Conclusion #12, was admi t ted. 
Evidence concern ing the Colonia l View Condomin ium Homeowners 
Associat ion was admit ted because it related to Conclusion #9. Evidence 
about the McCracken proper ty , where life tenants were concerned , was 
admit ted because it re lated to Conclusion # 1 1 . 
On the other hand, ev idence concerning the Thompson and Lavulo 
proper t ies was not admit ted for two reasons. One is that they were 
not re levant under any of the legal rul ings set out by the t r ia l court. 
Another is that the re jected Thompson and Lavulo i tems sought to 
exceed the statutory "as shown on the last assessment ro l l " requi rement 
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by adding yet more names. If there is not a l imi tat ion to the names "as 
shown" then there is no l imit at a l l , and the assessment rol l requi rement 
inevi tably is replaced wholesa le by the county recorder 's records. 
With respect to the quest ion raised about the "Thomas Tolman 
& Family Organizat ion, " the fo l lowing f inding of the t r ia l court is relevant 
(Ex. P-107, R. 303-304, 344): 
Findings of Fact 
15. The Thomas Tolman & Family Organizat ion (05-034-
0058) is one owner of property. 
The tr ial court af f i rmat ively found as a fact that this is one owner of 
real property, not two. If Pla int i f fs wish to chal lenge this f i nd ing , they 
must express ly do so and marshal the ev idence. They have fa i led to do 
th is , and their cha l lenge must therefore be re jec ted. There was no 
ev idence presented at t r ia l to contradict this f ind ing . The form of the 
s ignature is addressed in the argument herein concern ing t rustee 
s ignatures. 
The trial court did not abuse its d iscret ion in its ev ident ia ry 
dec is ions, and ought to be a f f i rmed. 
1 1 . THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE COLONIAL 
VIEW HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION AS AN "OWNER OF REAL 
PROPERTY" UNDER §10-2 -416 . 
Within the annexat ion area is a condominium development (Colonial 
View), which consists of indiv idual ly owned units and common areas (Ex. 
P-107, D-27, D-28, R. 353, 636-651). The common areas are 100% owned 
by the indiv idual unit owners on a percentage basis corresponding to their 
unit ownership (Ex. D-27). The tr ial court did not count the Homeowners 
Assoc ia t ion as a separate owner under §10-2-416 (R. 343, 353). 
Plaint i f fs complain in their Point VIII that there was inadequate evidence 
upon which to base this factual f ind ing. 
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The tr ia l court issued the fo l lowing (R. 299-300, 343) : 
Findings of Fact 
1 1 . The Colonia l View Condominium Assoc ia t ion ( 0 1 -
139-0020) is not an owner of real property separate f rom the 
indiv idual unit owners. The Condominium Declarat ion states 
that the undiv ided interest in the common areas is not to be 
separated from each unit. All of the unit owners have a l ready 
been counted as owners. 
Pla int i f fs c la im there was inadequate ev idence to support the 
court 's f ind ing . Nothing could be fur ther from the t ru th . The or ig inal 
condominium declarat ion amended declarat ion, which are recorded in the 
off ice of the Davis County Recorder, and admit ted as Exhib i ts D-27 
and D-28. Those documents each s ta ted: 
4. Common and Limited Common Areas and Fac i l i t ies . 
The Common areas and Faci l i t ies contained in the Project are 
descr ibed and ident i f ied in Art ic le I of this Dec la ra t ion . 
Neither the percentage of undivided interest in the Common 
Areas and Faci l i t ies nor the right of exclusive use of a Limited 
Common area and Facil i ty shall be separated from the Unit to 
which it attains] and even though not speci f ical ly ment ioned in 
the inst rument of t ransfer , such parcel of undiv ided interest 
and such right of exclusive use shall automat ical ly accompany 
the t ransfer of the Unit to which they re late. [Emphasis 
added. ] 
In addi t ion, Exhibit A to these declarations proved that the individual 
unit owners account for 100% of the ownership of common areas 
(Appendix D of Addendum) . Since the indiv idual unit owners own 
their own unit and their share of the common areas ( together tota l l ing 
100%), nothing is owned by the Homeowners Assoc ia t ion. The individual 
condominium unit owners were already each counted as "owners of real 
proper ty" (R. 352-355) . The t r ia l court 's decis ion that the homeowner 's 
associat ion was not an owner of real property because it owns nothing 
f lowed direct ly f rom the sound evidence before it. 
Fur thermore, the Utah Code has a provis ion which is re levant : 
57-8-27. (1) Each unit and its percentage of undivided 
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interest in the common areas and facilities shall be deemed to 
be a parcel of land and shal l be subject to separate 
assessment and taxat ion by each assessing unit and spec ia l 
distr ict for all types of taxes . . . . Neither the building or 
building, the property, nor any of the- common areas and 
facilities may be considered a parcel. [Emphasis added. ] 
This statute is a di rect ive to not count the homeowners assoc ia t ion. 
The tr ial court 's decis ion was based on the evidence, is wel l founded, and 
not clearly e r roneous. In fact , there was no evidence to the contrary. 
12. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED REMAINDERMEN 
AFTER LIFE ESTATES AS "OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY" UNDER 
§10-2-416. 
Within the annexat ion area involved in this case are two parcels 
of land held unde rdeeds reserving a life estate in favor of the grantor(s) 
(Ex. P-107, R. 343, 347). In the tr ial court it was held that the life tenants 
are owners of real property under §10-2-416 but that the fu ture interest 
holders ( i .e. , remaindermen) are not (R. 346). The Plaint i f fs complain in 
their Point IX that the remaindermen as wel l as life tenants should be 
counted as owners wi th in the s ta tu te . 
The tr ial court entered the fo l lowing (R. 294, 3 0 1 , 346, 347, 349): 
Conclus ions of Law 
1 1 . Future interest holders under a deed of t rust 
reserv ing a l i fe estate for the grantors are not owners of 
real property under Sect ion 10-2-416. 
2 1 . The Alber t Ouzounian property (01-022-0012) 
involves a l i fe estate reserved to Albert Ouzoun ian, and 
counts as one property owner. 
28. The McCracken property (05-033-0008) is held 
as a life estate in the names of Joseph and Mary McCracken, 
which counts as two owners. 
General l i fe estate law provides guidance on this matter. It 
states at 51 Am Jur 2d Life Tenants and Remaindermen Sect ion 2: 
As a genera l ru le, the tenant and the remainderman 
are not at the same time entitled to the same right or remedy. 
A remainderman has no right of possession until the particular 
[i.e, life] estate is terminated. He has no right of act ion, which 
depends upon the r ight of possess ion, unti l he is ent i t led to 
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the possess ion, ei ther to recover the possession or to obtain 
compensat ion for in jur ies to the possess ion. Hence, he 
cannot, before the termination of the life or other particular 
estate, maintain an action for ejectment, of trespass, of 
conversion, or for partition.,.. [Emphasis added.] 
This rule against future interest holders as having a present 
possessory interest was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
part i t ion case of Funk v. Young. 592 P.2d 619 (Utah 1978): 
Nor can one of the vested remaindermen compel such 
a sale since there is no possessory interest in the vested 
remainderman. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court in Sheppick v. Sheppick. 
44 Utah 131 , 138 P. 1169 (1914) , held that under § 59-2-201 property 
taxes should be assessed to the l ife tenants and not the remaindermen 
dur ing the cont inuance of the l i fe estate. Under the tr ia l court 's ru l ing, 
are we not here ta lk ing about the tax assessment rol l? 
The case In Re Smithf ield City. 262 P.2d (Utah 1927) concerned who 
to count as owners in a munic ipa l d isconnect ion pet i t ion. It was held: 
[W]e think that the weight of author i ty and the better 
reasoning def ines the word "ownersh ip , " as used in statutes 
similar to the one here involved, as propr ietorship or dominion 
over the property, rather than mere legal t i t le wi thout ei ther 
propr ietorship or domin ion . 
The remaindermen may not possess the property, and may not 
exercise any right of present ownership or domin ion . They are not taxed 
as property owners. Their interests lie str ict ly in the future. They should 
not be counted now as owners when they in fact have no present rights of 
ownership. The tr ia l court 's conc lus ion of law should be af f i rmed. 
13. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED A DEAD MAN AS 
AN "OWNER OF REAL PROPERTY" UNDER §10-2-416 . 
Within the annexat ion area, f ive men showing on the assessment 
roll were deceased (Ex. P-107, R. 303, 344). The tr ial court did not permit 
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dead people to be counted as owners (R. 346). The Plaint i f fs complain in 
t h e i r P o i n t X t h a t o n e d e a d man, Kenneth Murray, ought to be counted as 
an owner because he was alive at the beginning of the annexat ion process 
(though dead prior to the adoption of the pol icy dec lara t ion of December 
2nd) and did not sign an annexat ion pet i t ion . 
The tr ial court entered the fo l lowing (R. 303-304, 344, 346): 
Findings of Fact 
14. The fo l lowing proper t ies had deceased owners 
showing on the assessment ro l l , and the surv iv ing widows 
who owned in jo int tenancy are the sole owner of each 
proper ty : Larsen (05-034-0012) , Hansen (05-034-0032) , 
Brooks (05-034-0045) , Zobel l (05-034-0056) , and Murray 
(05-035-0014) . [Emphasis added. ] 
Conclus ions of Law 
12. An indiv idual who is dead is not an owner of real 
property under Section 10-2-416. In the case of real property 
where the t i t le is held in jo int tenancy with the r ight of 
surv ivorsh ip , the surviv ing jo int tenant is the sole owner. 
This Point X of the Plaint i f fs is the u l t imate hurdle which Plaint i f fs 
seek to impose upon the annexat ion process. It goes wi thout saying, 
though it wi l l be stated anyway, that dead men don' t s ign pet i t ions, so 
count ing them as owners guarantees they wil l always be non-pet i t ioners. 
It was long ago decided by the courts that the Medieval pract ices of 
dead hand rule of land by long-deceased people was wrong. Good public 
pol icy requires that such matters as these be determined by the l iv ing, 
and that is what the tr ia l court requ i red. 
In Re Smithf ie ld City, supra, is again app l i cab le : 
[W]e think that the weight of author i ty and the better 
reasoning def ines the word "ownersh ip , " as used in s tatutes 
similar to the one here involved, as propr ietorship or dominion 
over the proper ty , rather than mere legal t i t le w i thout ei ther 
propr ie torsh ip or domin ion. 
Dead men exerc ise no dominion over proper ty . In the part icular 
case of Kenneth Murray, it was proven that he died (R. 612-613) , that he 
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had held ownership of the property jo in t ly wi th his w i fe , Bi l l ie (R. 344, 
665), and the she surv ived him (R. 612-613) . There fo re , the t r ia l court 
appropr ia te ly counted her as the owner contempla ted under §10-2-416. 
ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1 . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING §10-2-414 TO 
REQUIRE A COUNT OF OWNERS AND PETITION SIGNERS (FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF DETERMINING A MAJORITY) AT THE MID-POINT OF THE 
ANNEXATION PROCESS WHEN THE POLICY DECLARATION WAS 
ADOPTED. 
The tr ia l court entered the fo l lowing (R. 291-292, 345) : 
Conclus ion of Law 
2. There must be a major i ty of owners as annexat ion 
pet i t ioners when the City Counci l votes to accept the 
annexat ion pet i t ion and when the City Counci l votes to adopt 
the annexat ion reso lu t ion. In addition, at the time of the 
adoption of the policy declaration, there must be a majority of 
owners as annexation petitioners if the Council is proceeding 
on the basis of the petition. However, if the City Counci l is 
proceeding on the basis of its own in i t ia t ive or that of the 
planning commission, then a majori ty as owners as pet i t ioners 
is not necessary. [Emphasis added. ] 
This Conclus ion of Law has no fac tua l underp inn ings and is 
str ict ly a statutory in terpretat ion. This court should give it no deference 
and review it for cor rectness. State v. Pena. 
This rul ing is fundamenta l ly f lawed. Sta tu tory and case law 
have combined to establ ish two points, and no others, at which cit ies must 
ascer ta in that a major i ty of the owners of real proper ty wi thin the 
proposed area of annexat ion have s igned, and st i l l s ign , the annexat ion 
pet i t ions. These two points are at the beginning of the process, when the 
City Counci l votes on whether to accept the annexat ion pet i t ion , and at 
the end, when the City Counci l votes on the annexat ion reso lu t ion. 
The first point , at the beginning of the process, is establ ished 
by the Utah Code: 
10-2-416. Whenever a major i ty of the owners of real 
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proper ty . . .sha l l desire to annex. . . to such mun ic ipa l i t y . . . they 
sha l l . . . f i le . . .a wr i t ten pet i t ion signed by the pe t i t i oners . The 
members of the governing body may, by reso lu t ion . . .accept 
the pet i t ion for annexat ion . . . . 
The second point , at the end of the process, is es tab l ished by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Bount i fu l City, supra. In that 
case it was held that there must st i l l be a major i ty of the owners on 
the annexat ion pet i t ion at the t ime the City Counci l votes on the 
annexat ion ord inance or reso lu t ion. 
At no other point in the process, under e i ther s ta tu tory or case 
law, is there a requi rement to determine yet another t ime that a major i ty 
of the property owners are st i l l s igned on the annexat ion pet i t ion . The 
tr ial court, however, has by the Conclusion of Law quoted above ruled that 
there must be a major i ty conf i rmat ion at the t ime of the adopt ion of the 
pol icy dec la ra t ion . This requires a third count to de termine a major i ty . 
The t r ia l court based its decis ion on a reading of the fo l lowing 
statutory i ta l ic ized language (R. 109-116): 
10-2-414. Before annexing. . .a munic ipa l i ty sha l l . . . in 
response to an initiated petition by real property owners as 
provided by law... ad opt a policy dec la ra t ion . . . . 
This in terpre ta t ion is fa l lac ious. The phrase "as provided by 
law" merely refers to the fact that the pet i t ion must be s igned by a 
major i ty of owners when it is submit ted to the city for acceptance 
under §10-2-416. In no way does it say that a re-count of owners and 
pet i t ioners must be made at the t ime of the pol icy dec la ra t ion adopt ion. 
No case law suppor ts this conclusion by the t r ia l cour t . 
Fur thermore, it makes no sense, when the law requires a majori ty at 
the beginning and at the end of the process, and when it permits the 
addi t ion and wi thdrawal of s ignatures in the in te r im, that a major i ty 
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requirement should also be interposed at var ious points in the middle of 
the process. The publ ic interest is fu l ly protected by the major i ty 
requi rement at the beginning and the end. Any mid-s t ream requirement 
is only an unnecessary burden on the annexat ion pet i t ioners and on the 
City receiv ing the pet i t ions. 
This Court should bear in mind that v i r tua l ly all of the tr ial at 
the d is t r ic t court was concerned with the count on December 2, 1992, 
when the annexat ion pol icy declarat ion was adop ted . If the Court 
adopts the posit ion of the Defendant City on this issue, the vast majori ty 
of the case at the tr ial court is rendered moot. Since it was s t ipu lated by 
the part ies that there were suff ic ient s ignatures at the t ime the annexat ion 
pet i t ion was received on October 7th, the only remain ing issue would be 
the count on December 9th when the annexat ion reso lu t ion was passed. 
That issue must be resolved in favor of susta in ing the annexat ion. 
On the quest ion of the December 9th s ignature count , the t r ia l court 
entered the fo l lowing (Ex. P-107, D-3, R. 341-356) : 
Conclusions of Law 
17. As a matter of s t ipulat ion of the par t ies and as a 
f inding of fact and conclusion of law, a major i ty of the owners 
of real property signed the annexat ion pet i t ions at the t ime the 
Bount i fu l City Counci l voted to accept them on October 7, 
1992. 
Findings of Fact 
19. Thi r teen s ignatures were added to the pet i t ions 
between December 3 and 9, 1992, as ind icated on Exhibi t 
A. 
In add i t ion , the evidence was accepted that f i f teen people had 
wi thdrawn their s ignatures between October 7th and December 2nd (Ex. 
D-4), ten of whom reinstated their s ignatures (ex. D-5). The net result of 
subtract ing ten, adding f ive, and adding th i r teen, is a net increase of eight 
pet i t ion s ignatures between October 7th and December 9 th . 
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Accordingly, there was ind isputably a major i ty of pet i t ioners at the 
t ime of the acceptance of the pet i t ions on October 7th. Based on the facts 
found by the court, then, on December 9th when the annexat ion resolut ion 
was adopted, there was a major i ty plus eight (R. 341-356) . 
If the court sustains this point and e l iminates the necessi ty of the 
December 2nd count, the judgment of the t r ia l court in uphold ing the 
annexat ion on December 9th should be a f f i rmed. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE TERM 
"OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY" IN SECTION 10-2-416 TO BE 
MODIFIED BY THE PHRASE "AS SHOWN IN THE LAST ASSESSMENT 
ROLL." 
A cr i t ical ly important term is "owners of real proper ty" as it 
appears in the fo l lowing annexat ion p rov is ion : 
10-2-416. Whenever a major i ty of the owners of real 
property and the owners of at least one- th i rd in value of the 
real property, as shown by the last assessment ro l ls , . . .sha l l 
desire to annex. . . to such munic ipa l i ty , they sha l l . . . [ f i le a 
map] . . . together with a wr i t ten pet i t ion s igned by the 
pet i t ioners. 
Thequest ion is, who or what qual i f ies as an "owner of real 
proper ty"? The tr ia l court entered the fo l lowing (R. 345) : 
Conclusion of Law 
7. The term "owners of real property" as used in Section 
10-2-416 means those owners of real proper ty as shown on 
the l as t t axassessmen t ro l l prior to December2 , 1992, subject 
to the rul ings of law stated by this Court . 
This Conclusion of Law has no factual underp inn ings and is str ict ly 
a s tatutory in terpreta t ion. This court should give it no deference and 
review it for correctness. State v. Pena. 
It is readily conceded that the t r ia l cour t 's posi t ion f inds support in 
Jensen v. Bount i fu l City, supra. However, that hold ing has been 
substant ia l ly reversed by subsequent case law on statutory construct ion, 
and to any extent that it has not been reversed , it ought to be overruled 
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now because it was never intended by the Utah Legis la ture that the 
phrase "as shown by the last assessment rol ls" should modify "a majori ty 
of the owners of real property." Beginning with the Utah Code of 1898, the 
law required that a major i ty of real property owners pet i t ion for 
annexat ion. There was no mention of "as shown on the last assessment 
ro l ls . " 
Sect ion 287. Whenever a major i ty of the owners of 
real property of any terr i tory lying cont iguous to the corporate 
l imits of any city shal l desire to annex such ter r i to ry to any 
c i ty , they shal l cause an accurate plat or map. . . . [1898 Utah 
Code] 
This same legal language cont inued on through the decades, 
though in 1953 the sect ion number was changed to 1 0 - 3 - 1 . Then in 
1957 the Utah Legis lature amended the sect ion (Chapter 14, Sect ion 
1 of 1957 Session Laws) to insert the phrase: "and the owners of not 
less than one- th i rd in value of the real proper ty , as shown by the last 
assessment ro l ls . " This new phrase is se l f - con ta in ing , with a new 
valuat ion requi rement added to the s ta tu te , and a qua l i f ie r of how to 
determine va lue. That qual i f ier was c lear ly not in tended to apply to 
the pre-ex is t ing term of "major i ty of owners of real proper ty . " 
This pr inciple of statutory interpretat ion was the precise holding of 
the post -Jensen case of Bount i fu l v. Swif t . 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah 1975). 
A l though it is a non-annexat ion case, its rul ing is of great importance 
here: 
The defendants in their cha l lenge that Bount i fu l City 
did not proceed according to leg is la t ive requ i rements rely 
on Sec. 10-8-8, U.C.A. 1953, which provides as fo l lows: 
They may lay out, es tab l ish, open, al ter, w iden , 
narrow, extend, grade, pave or o therwise improve 
s t reets , a l leys, avenues, bou levards , s idewalks , 
parks, a i rports, . . .publ ic grounds, . . .and may vacate 
the same or parts thereof, by ord inance. 
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It is the theory of the defendants that every power 
given to ci t ies as out l ined in 10-8-8 supra must be 
accomplished by the enactment of an ord inance. . . . [A] logical 
interpretat ion of this statute does not indicate that a city must 
enact an ord inance for every power given by 10-8-8 supra. . . . 
Further after enumerat ing the powers of the city the 
statute goes on to say 
. . .and may vacate the same or parts thereof , by 
ord inance. [Emphasis is by the Court . ] 
"And" means "in addi t ion to , " implying that in addi t ion to 
the enumerated powers supra, the city "may vacate. . .by 
ord inance." 
By applying this same line of reasoning to §10-2-416, it is clear 
that "as shown by the last assessment ro l ls" only modi f ies "at least 
one-th i rd in value of the real proper ty . " 
There is addi t ional logic behind this in te rpre ta t ion . The statutory 
job of the assessor is to assign value to real proper ty . So in determin ing 
whether there is one-third value, it makes sense to look to the assessment 
rol ls. However, the county recorder 's of f ice, which has the legal duty to 
maintain land ownership records, is the place to look to determine real 
property ownership. 
The assessment roll dec is ion of 
now on the basis of public pol icy. 
very big problem with the dec is ion 
El lett in his concurr ing op in ion: 
Bel iev ing as I do that the ord inance of annexat ion 
was not proper ly passed, I do not th ink it is necessary to 
decide the other issues, particularly the question of whether 
a nonowner of property can sign a petition for annexation 
merely because a year or so prior thereto he happened to have 
his name upon the assessment roll. [Emphasis added. ] 
Taking the Jensen holding to its logical conc lus ion , if a landowner 
owns property adjacent to a city on January 1st, then in May sells to 
Jensen ought to be overturned 
Right from the start there was a 
which was ment ioned by Just ice 
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a buyer, the se l ler -nonowner can sign a pet i t ion in November to have 
this single property annexed to the ci ty, and the buyer-owner would 
not have any voice whatsoever in the process. Yet common sense and 
sound public pol icy suggest that the buyer-owner should be able to 
s ign, and se l ler -nonowner should not. The mistake made in Jensen 
ought not to be perpetuated longer for any reason. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE TERM "OWNERS 
OF REAL PROPERTY" IN §10-2-416 TO INCLUDE GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITIES. 
Within the area of the annexat ion are parcels of real estate owned 
by governmenta l ent i t ies, Davis County and the South Davis Water 
Improvement Distr ic t . With respect to these, the t r ia l court issued the 
fo l lowing Conclus ion (R. 346): 
Conclus ions of Law 
10. Governmenta l ent i t ies which own proper t ies wi th in 
the proposed annexat ion area are owners of real property 
under Sect ion 10-2-416. . . . 
This Conclus ion of Law has no factua l underp inn ings and is 
str ict ly a statutory in terpreta t ion. This court should give it no deference 
and review it for cor rectness. State v. Pena. 
These governmenta l ent i t ies should not be counted as "owners of 
real property" because their avenue of par t ic ipat ion in the annexat ion 
process is already f ixed by law. §10-2-402 of the Utah Code sets up a 
boundary commission to consider s i tuat ions where af fected ent i t ies may 
part ic ipat ion in annexat ions. An "affected ent i ty" is def ined at Section 10-
1-104(8) to mean "a county, munic ipa l i ty or other ent i ty possessing 
taxat ion powers. . . . " By def in i t ion, Davis County is an affected enti ty. By 
the holding of Pike Countrys ide Annexat ion v. Vernal City. 711 P.2d 240 
(Utah 1985), a water and sewer improvement d ist r ic t is also an affected 
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ent i ty . 
The Utah Code, therefore, has set up the means by which 
governmental ent i t ies may part ic ipate in the annexat ion process. It is not 
by counting them as "owners of real property," but rather by counting them 
as "af fected en t i t i es " which may appeal to the Boundary Commiss ion. 
They should not be counted as both. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment in favor of the Defendant Bount i fu l City should be 
a f f i rmed, though modi f ied as to the issues raised on Cross -Appea l . 
Dated this 21 st day of Apr i l , 1995. 
_ 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Russel l L. Mahan 
At torney for the Defendant City 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I cert i fy that on Apri l 2 1 , 1 995, I mailed three copies of th is Brief of 
the Appe l lee /Cross-Appe l lan t , with f i rst class postage prepaid thereon, 






Const i tu t iona l & 
Statutory Provis ions 
> CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their 
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 
STATUTORY TITLES IN UTAH 
TITLE 10 
CITIES AND TOWNS 
10-1-103. Construction. 
The powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be 
liberally construed to permit the municipality to exercise the 
powers granted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to 
the intent of the law. 
10-8-8. Streets, parks, airports, parking facilities, public 
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grounds and pedestrian malls. 
They may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, narrow, 
extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve streets, alleys, 
avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks, airports, parking Iocs or 
other facilities for the parking of vehicles off streets, public 
grounds, and pedestrian malls and may vacate the same or parts 
thereof, by ordinance. 
TITLE 2 0A 
ELECTION CODE 
20A-4-105. Standards and requirements for evaluating voter's 
ballot choices. 
(6) (a) In counting the ballots, the counters shall give 
full consideration to the intent of the voter. 
(b). The counters may not invalidate a ballot because of 
mechanical and technical defects in voting or failure on the part 
of the voter to follow strictly the rules for balloting required 




CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP ACT 
57-8-27. Separate taxation. 
(1) Each unit and its percentage of undivided interest in 
the common areas and facilities shall be deemed to be a parcel 
and shall be subject to separate assessment and taxation by each 
assessing unit and special district for all types of taxes 
authorized by law, including but not limited to, ad valorem 
levies and special assessments. Neither the building or 
buildings, the property, nor any of the common areas and 
facilities may be considered a parcel. 
In the event any of the interests in real property made 
subject to this chapter by the declaration are leasehold 
interests, if the lease creating these interests is of record in 
the office of the county recorder, if the balance of the term 
remaining under the lease is at least 40 years at the time the 
leasehold interest is made subject to this chapter, if units are 
situated or are to be situated on or wichin the real property 
covered by the lease, and if the lease provides that the lessee 
shall pay all taxes and assessments imposed by governmental 
authority, then until ten years prior to the date that the 
leasehold is to expire or until the lease is terminated, 
whichever first occurs, all taxes and assessments on the real 
property covered by the lease shall be levied against the owner 
of the lessee's interest. If the owner of the reversion under the 
lease has executed the declaration and record of survey map, 
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until ten years prior to the date that the leasehold is to 
expire, or until the lease is terminated, whichever first occurs, 
all taxes and assessments on the real property covered by the 
lease shall be separately levied against the unit owners having 
an interest in the lease, with each unit owner for taxation 
purposes being considered the owner of a parcel consisting of his 
undivided condominium interest in the fee of 
the real property affected by the lease. 
TITLE 59 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
CHAPTER 2 
PROPERTY TAX ACT 
59-2-303• General duties of county assessor, 
(1) Prior to May 22 each year, the county assessor shall 
ascertain the names of the owners of all property which is 
subject to taxation by the county, and shall assess the property 
to the owner, claimant of record, or occupant in possession or 
control at 12 o'clock midnight of January 1 in the tax year, 
unless a subsequent conveyance of ownership of the real property 
was recorded in the office of the county recorder more than 14 
calendar days before the date of mailing of the tax notice. In 
that case, any tax notice may be mailed, and the tax assessed, to 
the new owner. No mistake in the name or address of the owner or 
supposed owner of property renders the assessment invalid. 
(2) A county assessor shall become fully acquainted with all 
property in his county, as provided in Section 59-2-301. 
TITLE 7 5 
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
CHAPTER 7 
TRUST ADMINISTRATION 
75-7-406. Third persons protected in dealing with trustee. 
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or 
assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the 
existence of trust power and their proper exercise by the trustee 
may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is not bound no 
inquire whether the trustee has power to act or is properly 
exercising the power; and a third person, without actual 
knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly 
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee 
as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers he 
purports to exercise. A third person is not bound to assure the 







7 8-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record 
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction; 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
UTAH CODE, 1893 
Section 287. Whenever a majority of owner of real property of 
any territory lying contiguous to the corporate limits of any 
city shall desire to annex such territory to any city, they shall 
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RESOLUTION OECLARING THE ANNEXATION OF / 
TERRITORY TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF BOUNTIFUL 
WHEREAS, a majority of the owners of reai property and thA owners 0/ not 
less than one-third in vaiue of the reai property as shown on the last assessment reds In 
territory lying contiguous to this munidpairty have petitoned this municpality for 
annexation; and 
WHEREAS, the petrtion was accompanied by an accurate piat oc map of the 
territory to be annexed, prepBro<i under the supervision of the City Engineer or a 
competent surveyor and certified by the engineer or surveyor; and 
WHEREAS, the petition and piat or map have been filed In the office of the 
municipal recorder; and 
^hEREAS, the City Council adopted an Ordinance accapting the petition 
for annexation for the purpose of preparing a Policy Declaration; and 
WHEREAS, the City Councl held a public hearing wrth notice pecwdtd to 
residents of the arfected territory, and a copy of the proposed Policy Declaration, together 
with notice of such hearing, was mailed to the tocai boundary commission and affected 
enoties; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council adopted a PoOcy Declaration In support and 
m favor of annexation, and ft appearing that no protest has been filed by written 
application by an affected entity wthin five days following said pubflc hearing; 
fT IS THEREFORE RESOLVED by the City Counol of Bountiful, Utah, that 
the territory described below Is hereby deciared annexed to the municipality of Bountiful, 
Utah: 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
Adopted by a vote of at least two-thirds of the governing body this 9th day 





Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law 
59 
Russell L. Mahan (#2059) 
Attorney for the Defendant 
790 South 100 East 
Bountiful, Utah 8^010 
Teiepnone (801) 298-614-3 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH 
JAiMES SZATKOWSKI and . Civil No. 93-070033 9-CV 
VERNAL W. THOMPSON, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiffs, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Defendant. 
The trial of this case was held on Monday, November 7 , and Wednesday, November 9, 1994, 
with the Honoraole Judge Jon M Memmott presiding, at the Davis County Courthouse in 
Farmington, Utah. Plaintiffs James Szatkowski and Vernal W Tnompson were present personallv, 
and were represented by their attorney, Paul W Mortensen. The Defendant was represented by 
Russell L. Mahan. After hearing the testimony of witnesses, receivmg exhibits, and hearing the oral 
argument of counsel, the Court entered the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law-
FTNDINGS OF FACT 
1. All of the properties within the annexation area involved in this case are listed by tax 
serial number on Exhibit A, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
DEC (2 U 07 ft '% 
CL£-
uc - 1 . :__"•<, -Y ' 
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Some owners owned more than one parcel, and those duplicates are listed on the last page of Exhibit 
A. Owners were counted once, regardless of how many parcels they owned. 
2. There were 263 owners of real property within the annexation area, the names of whom 
are listed on Exhibit A. 
2. Of those 263 owners, 132 signed the annexation petition as of December 2, 1992, when 
the Policy Declaration was adopted. Those who signed are indicated on Exhibit A by being 
italicized. This constitutes a majority of the owners of reai property in the annexation area. 
3. Of those 263 owners, 131 did not sign the annexation petition as of December 2, 1992. 
Tnose who did not sign are indicated on Exhibit A by the regular, non-italicized type. 
4. A majority of the owners representing at least one-third of the value as shown on the last 
assessment roil did sign the annexation petition. 
5. There are two properties (01-022-0051 and 05-033-0010) owned in the name of the Fred 
and Carma Harrison Trust. Tnere is no evidence that these are different trusts, and the court finds 
that these two properties are owned by one trust. 
6. The City has determined that the requirement of a map prepared by the City Engineer 
being submitted to the City Recorder together with the petition signatures, as set forth in 10-2-416, 
has been met. There is no factual evidence that this decision by the City constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 
7. The following property owners signed the annexation petition without a map being 
attached to their signatures pages: Rhea (01-022-0052); Collins (01-022-0053), Bridge (01-139-
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0004), Thompson (05-003-0053), Olson (05-003-0055), Ensign (05-003-0056), Lavulo (05-033-
0016), Merrill (05-033-0020), Siddoway (05-033-0021), Kan (05-03^-0001), Conder (05-03^-000^), 
Clark (05-03^-0006), Chabries (05-034-0013), Pulsipher (05-034-001*), Lewis (05-034-0015), 
Broschinsky (05-034-0017), Gregersen (05-03^-0024), McCraley (05-034-0026), and Robinson (05-
035-0111). 
8. The following properties were owned by trusts, and were signed by trustees without 
referencing their trustee capacity: Watson (01-028-0003), Averett (05-033-0032), Marker (05-033-
0051), Clark (05-03^-0006), Pulsipher (05-034-0014), Schmidt (05-034-0049), Goodrich (05-03^-
0059), and Luke (05-035-0020). 
9. The signature of Merrill Lee Sorenson (01-139-0009) appearing on the annexation petition 
was signed by his wife. 
10. The signature of Michael Gonce (01-139-0014) as an annexation petitioner is on a form 
different from the other petitioners, but the format used does clearly state that he wishes that the 
annexation take place. 
11. The Colonial View Condominium Association (01-139-0020) is not an owner of real 
property separate from the individual unit owners. The Condominium Declaration states that the 
undivided interest in the common areas is not to be separated from each unit. All of the unit owners 
have already been counted as owners. 
12. The McCracken property (05-033-0008) is held as life estate in the names of Joseph and 
Mary McCracken. 
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13. The Lavuio property (05-033-0016) has one owner, Groberg Lavuio. 
i^. The following properties had deceased owners showing on the assessment roil, and the 
surviving widows who owned in joint tenancy are the sole owner of each property: Larsen (05-03 4-
0012), Hansen (05-034-0032), Brooks (05-034-00*5), Zobeil (05-03^-0056), and Murray (05-035-
0014). 
15. The Thomas Toiman & Family Organization (05-03^-0058) is one owner of property. 
16. There were a majority of property owners signing the annexation petition on each of 
October 7, 1992, December 2, 1992, and December 9, 1992. 
17. The Bountiful City Council vote on each of those occasions was by a two-thirds vote. 
18. The Annexation Resolution adopted by the Bountiful City Council is a valid annexation 
resolution. 
19. Thirteen signatures were added to the petitions between December 3 and 9, 1992, as 
indicated on Exhibit A. 
20. The annexation signature count on December 9, 1992, was 145 signatures in favor and 
118 not signing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The right of petition is one of the most important processes that we have, in which the 
average citizen can get involved to petition the government from the outside and ask the government 
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to act. 
2. The proper inquiry of the Court is to determine whether the Defendant Bounniui City had 
statutory authority to annex the area in question, and whether there was substandai compliance with 
statutory requirements. 
3. The determination of whether the annexation petition has met ail of the statutory standards 
is vested in the City, and the review by the Court is to determine whedier the City has abused that 
discretion. 
4. Annexation laws are to be interpreted liberally to effectuate their purpose and farther 
public policy. 
5. The annexation resolution of the Bountiful City Council is entitled to a presumption of 
validity, and the burden of proof is upon the Plaintiffs in this case. 
6. The appropriate standard for reviewing the City's procedures is "substantial compliance.'1 
However, specific legal requirements such as having a majority of signatures, etc., are not measured 
by substantial compliance but must be met. 
7. The term "owners of real property" as used in Section 10-2-416 means those owners of 
real property as shown on the last tax assessment roll prior to December 2, 1992, subject to the 
rulings of law stated by this Court. 
8. Tnere must be a majority of owners as annexation petitioners when the City Council votes 
to accept the annexation petition and when the City Council votes to adopt the annexation resolution. 
In addition, at the time of the adoption of the policy declaration, there must be a majority of owners 
64 
as annexation petitioners if the Council is proceeding on the basis of the petition. However, if the 
Ciry Council is proceeding on the basis of its own initiative or that of the planning commission, then 
a majority as owners as petitioners is not necessary. 
9. The homeowners association of a condominium development may or may not constitute 
an owner of real property under Section 10-2-416 depending upon the particular facts of that 
condominium. 
10. Governmental entities which own properties within the proposed annexation area are 
owners of real property under Section 10-2-416. Tney are either owners as a legal entity or corporate 
entity or some other type of entity, but they are still owners of real property. 
11. Future interest holders under a deed of trust reserving a life estate for the grantors are 
not owners of real property under Section 10-2-416. 
12. An individual who is dead is not an owner of real property under Section 10-2-416. In 
the case of reai property where the title is heid in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, the 
surviving joint tenant is the sole owner. In the case of joint tenancy, without this right of 
survivorship, or other joint ownership arrangement, the estate of the decedent v^ould hold the 
ownership after the death of an owner. 
13. When a property is owned by a partnership, the validity of the signature of a partner may 
or may not constitute a signature of an owner of real property under Section 10-2-416 depending 
upon the particular facts of that partnership. 
14. Signatures on the annexation petition may be both added and withdrawn prior to the 
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annexation resolution vote of the City Council. 
15. Withdrawals of signatures which are not turned into the City are of no legal 
consequence. 
16. When a home is owned by a trust, the trust is the owner of real property under the 
annexation laws, which constitutes one owner of real property under Section 10-2-416. 
17. As a matter of stipulation of the parties and as a finding of fact and conclusion of law, 
a majority of the owners of real property signed the annexation petitions at the time the Bountiful 
City Council voted to accept them on October 7, 1992. 
18. The Complaint of the Plaintiffs is considered as brought under the statutory remedy 
provided by Section 10-2-423, and not pursuant to Rule 65B of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
19. A majority of the owners representing at least one-third of the vaiue as shown on the last 
assessment roll did sign the annexation petition. The Plaintiffs have made no challenge on this 
point 
20. There are 263 property owners within the annexation area, and 132 validly signed the 
annexation petition as of December 2, 1992. Tnis constitutes a majority by one. 
21. The Albert Ouzounian property (01-022-0012) involves a life estate reserved to Albert 
Ouzounian, and counts as one property owner. 
22. There are two properties (01-022-0051 and 05-033-0010) owned in the name of the Fred 
and Carina Harrison Trust This counts as one owner of two properties. 
23. The City has determined that the requirement that a map prepared by the City Engineer 
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be submitted to the City Recorder together with the petition signatures, as set forth in 10-2-214, has 
been met. Tnere is no abuse of discretion in this decision. The Court does not Snd in the statute that 
there is a requirement that a map be attached to each individual annexation petition page that is 
actually signed. Therefore, the Court rejects the challenges to the validity of all signatures without 
a map individually attached, to the signature page, including challenges to the following signatures: 
Rhea (01-022-0052) , Collins (01-022-0053), Bridge (01-139-0004), Thompson (05-003-0053), 
Olson (05-003-0055), Ensign (05-003-0056), Lavuio (05-033-0016), Merrill (05-033-0020), 
Siddoway (05-033-0021), Han (05-034-0001), Conder (05-034-0004), Clark (05-034-0006), 
Chabries (05-034-0013), Pulsipher (05-034-0014), Lewis (05-034-0015), Broschinsky (05-034-
0017), Gregersen (05-034-0024), McCraiey (05-034-0026), and Robinson (05-035-0111). 
24. Trustees of trusts which own properties within the annexation area need not expressly 
sign the annexation petitions in their trustee capacities. There has been substantial compliance when 
the trustees signed the petition in their own names. Therefore, the Court rejects the challenges to 
the validity of signatures by trustees that do not state their trustee capacity, including the following 
signatures: Watson (01-028-0003), Averett (05-033-0032), Harker (05-033-0051), Clark (05-034-
0006), Pulsipher (05-034-0014), Schmidt (05-034-0049), Goodrich (05-034-0059), and Luke (05-
035-0020). 
25. The signature of Merrill Lee Sorenson (01-139-0009) by his wife is not a valid petition 
signature. However, Beth Sorensen's signature is valid. 
26. The signature of Michael Gonce (01-139-0014) as an annexation petitioner is in 
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substantial compliance with the law, and is to be counted as a valid signature. 
27. The Colonial View Condominium Association (01-139-0020) under its Condominium 
Declaration is not an owner of real property separate from the individual unit owners, and is not to 
be counted as an owner of real property. 
28. Tat McCracken property (05-033-0008) is held as a life estate in the names of Joseph 
and Mary McCracken, which counts as two owners. 
29. The Lavuio property (05-033-0016) is counted as having one owner, Groberg Lavulo.. 
30. The following properties had deceased owners showing on the assessment roil, and the 
surviving widows who owned in joint tenancy are counted as the sole owner of each property: 
Larsen (05-034-0012), Hansen (05-034-0032), Brooks (05-034-0045), ZobeU (05-03^-0056), and 
Murray (05-035-0014). 
31. Trie Tnomas Tolman & Family Organization (05-034-0058) is counted as one owner of 
the property. 
32. Tnere was a majority of property owners signing the annexation petition on October 7, 
1992, December 2, 1992, and December 9, 1992. 
33. The Bountiful City Council vote on annexation matters on each of those occasions was 
by a two-thirds vote. 
34. The Annexation Resolution adopted by the Bountiful City Council is a valid annexation 
resolution. 
35. Thirteen signatures were added to the petitions between December 3 and 9, 1992. They 
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are SQt out in Exhibit A. 
36. The signature count on December 9, 1992, was 1^ 5 signatures in favor and 118 aot 
signing. 
37. The Defendant Bountiiul City is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the 
annexation laws of the State of Utah concerning this particular annexation, and the annexation 
petitions contained valid signatures from a majority of property owners at all times required by law. 
Dated this i day of November, 1994. 
-Jfrv^VU. U\9,?AAAANMY 




OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY 
Italicized ~ signed annexation petition as of December 2, 1992-




01-022-0002 Scho field, lames C *72 W. 3100 South 
01-022-0003 Wirthlin, Lee W. ^32 W. 3100 South 
01-022-0004 Klrkman, lames/Cayie 376 W. 3100 South 
01-022-0005 D M L Partnership 366 W. 3100 South - 1 
01-022-0006 Graham, irvin L/laura M. 346 W. 3100 South 
01-022-0007 Koecher, Walter ETHerta 334 W. 3100 South 
01-022-0008 Ones, Keich/jotene 238 W. 3100 South 
01-022-0010 Ouzounian, Arthur/Syivia 182 W. 3100 South 
01-022-0011 Ensign, Srent NJDanell A. 172 W. 3100 South 
01-022-0012 Ouzounian, Albert 154 W. 3100 South 
01-022-0013 The A.M.P. Trust 132 W. 3100 South - 1 
01-022-000 Schuities,Gorcon Jr7Debbie 
01-022-0041 Mock, Eldon JJDonna 
01-022-00^2 Wilson, Larry liDenise 
01-022-00^3 Mortensen, Fern W. 
01-022-0044 Wiikins, Russell M., Tr. 
01-022-00^5 Wail, Leonard jyCaroi E. 
01-022-0046 Pfct, Charles H./Margaret 
01-022-0049 Madsen, Clendon WJ Betty 
01-022-0050 Rigby, Boyd CJCarol Fay 
01-022-0051 Harrison, Fred wyCarma,Tr. 
01-O22-00S2 Rhea, Francis A./Helen 
01-022-0053 Collins, Carl V./Aucumn R. 
3059 S. Orchard Dr. 
456 W. 3100 South 
^46 W. 3100 South 
3032 S. 400 West 
3046 S. 400 West 
3066 S. 400 West 
3082 S. 400 West 
3072 S. 300 West 
312 W. 3100 South 
3043 S. 300 West 
3057 S. 300 West 
3069 S. 300 West 
01-022-0054 Coilins, Carol 
01-022-0078 Such-Neibar,Teresa/Rex Neibar 
01-022-0085 Davis County 
01-022-0090 Schwendiman, Terry DWeva 
01-028-0001 Crawley, Frederick SJLois 
01-028-0002 McRae, Karl MJCarol 8., Tr. 
01-028-0003 Wacson,Harold/Ora Cox 5. Tr. 
01-028-0038 Knight, Kenneth K. 
01-028-0039 Moses, Devon!Sharon 
01-028-0040 Stout, CleamondConstance 
01-028-0041 Phister, Warren KJDiane 8. 
01-028-0042 Wagstaff, Mark Meanne 
01-139-0001 Watson, David lee/Jennifer 
01-039-0002 Schvaneveldt, Marie 
01-139-0003 Wigren, Paul RJHeidi J. 
01-039-0004 Bridge, Sherry 
268 W. 3100 South 
232 W. 3100 South 
3044 S. 300 West 
3088 S. 100 West 
3067 S. 100 West 
3083 S. 100 West 
3038 S. 100 West 
3048 S. 100 West 
3052 S. Davis 8!vd. 
3062 S. Davis Blvd. 
3082 S. Davis 8ivd, 
3045 S. Orchard Dr. A 
3045 S. Orchard Dr. 8 
3045 S. Orchard Or. C 



















































Hansen, Lanny /./Linda F, 
Roberts, Crane L/Lisa 5. 
Smith, Jeweil N. 
Kuenn, San £.f Jr. 
Sorensen, Mernil lee/Beth 
Henne, Samara T. 
Huooara, Michael 8. 
Soutnon, Erie /./Nafanua Y. 
Pauiicn, Lana J. 
Conce, Michael E. 
Hyaa, Gregory N./Tonya O. 
Moll, Ernest SJMyrna D. 
Turner, Scocc DTFreya C 
Coioniai View Conao Assoc. 




8arxon, /. Colden/Norene 
Kocnemans,Larn/ D /Carolyn 
Thomoson, Elmer & Donald, 
Olsen, Dale/Frankie 
Ensign, Paul StuartfTamra 
Lewis, Chris A./Anne M. 
Halstead, Walter C/Mavia 
Skare, Elaine AVJames C 
Cines, Paul KJLynecte 
McCraocen, Josepn/Mary 
Kunkei, Matthew AVDiane 
Heao, David UA. Chairae 
Warrick, Devon W7Gwen L 
Kawar, Faisal TyBetty M.,Tr 
Borg, 5eth JVJuamta 1. 
Sim, Fred AYBecty Jean, Tr 
Lavulo, Croberg 
Norton,Lawrence AVAnita 
Ripley, Geraid RVMary L. 
Merrill, Gary Lynn/Evelyn 
Siddoway, Philip MJChnstie 
Goison, Chad "87Jaeiynn 
Selin, Lynn HJMary Rae 
Naegie, Lorraine P. 
Nava/co of Utah 
Peck, Dixie Lee 
Buttler, Heinz F ./Carol R. 
Address 
3047 S. Orchard Dr. 
3047 S. Orchard Dr. 
30^7 S. Orcnara Dr. 
3047 S. Orcnard Dr. 
30^9 S. Orcnard Dr. 
3049 S. Orchard Dr. 
3049 S. Orcnara Dr. 
30*9 S. Orcnard Dr. 
3051 S. Orchard Dr. 
3051 S. Orchard Dr. 
3051 S. Orchard Dr. 
3051 S. Orchard Dr. 
3051 S. Orchard Dr. 
3051 S. Orchard Dr. 
27*3 S. Orcnard Dr. 
2793 S. Orcnard Dr. 
3011 S. Orcnard Dr. 
2711 S. Orcnard Dr. 
2762 S. 300 West 
2723 S. Orcnara Dr. 
2782 S. 300 West 
2812 S. 300 West 
2838 S. 300 West 
291 7 S. 300 West 














2981/2979 S. 300 West 
3009 S 300 West 
3027 S 300 West 
262 W 3000 South 
238 W 3000 South 
2*7 W. 3000 South 
218 W. 3000 South 
219 W. 3000Soutn 
202 W. 3000 South 
203 W. 3000 South 
176 W. 3000Soutn 
156 W. 3000 South 
157W. 3000 South 
138 W. 3000 South 
133 W. 3000 South 
2974 S. 100 West 
117 W. 3000 South 
261 W. 2900 South 
243 W. 2900 South 
217 W. 2900 South 
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The A.M.P. Trust 
DML Partnership 
Turner, Scott & Freya 
Turner, Scott & Freya 
Davis County 
Haistead, Walter & Mavia 
Harrison, Fred & Carma Trust 
Norton, Lawrence & Anita 
Mitchell, Brent & Cheryl 
Mortensen, Fern 
South Davis Water Imorovement District 
75 
APPENDIX D 
Exhibi t A to Condomin ium 
Declarat ion 





msuaJVOMttim CT WMM Tgt WEWflfllWa ffigflCT 
3047, and 3049 will *ont*in four (*) f lai l* f u l l y <*w«Ul»«».< 
Building Ko. 3051 vtt l &*•« * w (*) nU>4U fw i iy 4«ani&*a tad 
tfcr*« (3) aomtroi*! offica «ilt«« 
p»r«#nt Owwrthlp in C©*aon Jrtas 
and fmoiHtitf, (Xiao dataraina-
tira *f rrtl&f riffcta ar>d uaad u 
ft fa»aral tea I a far pro rata, •hart 






































































































4 . 3 
5 . 1 
5 . 4 
6 .7 
4 . 3 
5 . 1 
5 . 4 
6 . 7 
4 . 3 
3 . 1 
3 . 4 
4 . 4 
4 . 9 
5.4 
5.9 
6 . 0 
3*5 
id* 
TOTALS 19.205 1 0 0 . 0 0 * 
77 
mrai A 1090 
XSL 
BfittOT re?ittA:iw 9r W H E W ^ g y gOTflircrnK mim 
Th« proitot wi l l hara four (4) ouiidlnca. Juildinxa 3045, 
3047, and 3049 wil l contain four (4) tin«l« faai ly d»ai l inc i . 
Building flo. 3051 wi l l hara four (4) s in f l t faai ly dwallin«a and 
-thr«« (3) commercial off l e t uni t i , 
Ptrcant Ownarahip in Common Araaa 
and 7mci l i t i ta . (Alao datarmina-
tira of rotin< ri«hta and ua«d aa 
Appro*. No, Ho, of ftoo«« a fanaral omaia for pro rat* ihara 
8 3 1-3A 6,7 
7 2 1-1/2 4.3 
7 2 1-1/2 5.1 
6 2 1 5.4 
8 3 1-3A 6.7 
7 2 1-1/2 4.3 
7 2 1-1/2 5.1 
6 2 1 5.4 
8 3 1-3A 6.7 
7 2 1-1/2 4.3 
7 2 1-1/2 5.1 
6 2 1 5.4 
5 2 1 4,4 
5 2 1 4.9 
5 2 1 5,4 
7 2 2 5.9 
(1) 1142 2 1 6\0 
(2) 662 2 1 3 . 5 
- i l l 1222 1 i L* 
TOTALS 19.205 100,00* 
(A) 
(8) 
(C) 
(I» 
ttnita 3047 
U) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
Uniti 3049 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
Tnita 3051 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(0) 
Sftifiia 
1289 
832 
976 
1045 
1289 
832 
976 
1045 
1289 
832 
976 
1045 
837 
we 
1036 
1131 
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